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ECONOMIC THEORY LOST IN TRANSLATION:
WILL BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS RESHAPE
THE COMPELLED COMMERCIAL
SPEECH DOCTRINE?
Kyle Rozema*
For half a century, Congress has required that tobacco companies
include text-based warning labels on cigarette packages.  In 2009, Con-
gress decided that these warnings were insufficient and should be sup-
plemented by graphic images of cigarette smoke flowing out of exposed
tracheas and warnings of nicotine’s addictiveness.  Congress’s decision
was informed by Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman’s research in behav-
ioral economics, which ranks salient, emotion-evoking images as being
more effective than textual statements in promoting the internalization of
advertising messages.  Ill-equipped to handle the First Amendment impli-
cations of this measure, courts have fumbled over the question of
whether these graphic images reshape warning information into a form
of speech, compelling a state-imposed ideology upon the tobacco
industry.
This Article consolidates the economic and legal theory needed to
properly analyze the impact of salience measures on the commercial
speech doctrine.  By walking through various First Amendment scena-
rios, this Article describes and differentiates between the two main gov-
ernmental interests motivating graphic image requirements on cigarette
labels: reducing smoking and informing consumers.  The Article then
sets up a game-theoretic model of the compelled commercial speech doc-
trine and uses Bayesian inference to make assumptions about how the
Supreme Court would rule if it eventually rules on similar graphic
images placed on cigarette labels.  Solving the model by way of forward
induction yields the prediction that the constitutionality of the graphic
image requirements will depend on whether the images are ideologically
neutral.
This Article makes three basic arguments.  First, it argues that, to
assess the constitutionality of the salience measure, we must first under-
stand the economic underpinnings that motivated Congress to implement
* Economics Ph.D. Candidate, Cornell University; J.D., Washington University in St.
Louis; B.S.E., Mechanical Engineering, Grand Valley State University.  Many thanks to Josh
Chafetz, Michael Frakes, Don Kenkel, John Cawley, Scott Stirling, Gary Cohen, Joel Landry,
and Rachel Hestrin whose valuable comments much improved this Article.
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the graphic image requirements in the first place.  Specifically, the mea-
sure’s constitutionality depends on whether Congress is using increased
salience solely to promote effective internalization or whether it is going
beyond that to compel expression of smoking is disgusting.  Second, this
Article contends that Daniel Kahneman’s two-system model of cognitive
function should be used to make this determination.  Finally, it argues
that certain images attempted to manipulate consumers’ emotions to pre-
vent rational decision-making, and that the measure should therefore
have been held unconstitutional.
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INTRODUCTION
The following “pass it on” game begins when Economist secretly
whispers a short story to Member of Congress and tells Member of Con-
gress to pass it on.  The story then secretly works its way from Member
of Congress to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and finally
from the FDA to the D.C. Circuit.  The game ends when the D.C. Circuit
stands up and tells the story.
Economist:1 Government should not intervene with prop-
erly functioning markets.  The tobacco market
does not function properly because: (1) smok-
ers do not consider the healthcare costs to soci-
ety when they smoke and (2) consumers are
not fully informed about the risks and conse-
quences of smoking.  Therefore, government
should intervene to fix both problems.  Gov-
1 For a comprehensive review on the market failures of smoking, see John Cawley &
Christopher J. Ruhm, The Economics of Risky Health Behaviors, in 2 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH
ECON. 95–200 (Mark V. Pauly et al. eds., 2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-1\CJP103.txt unknown Seq: 3 20-NOV-13 15:25
2013] ECONOMIC THEORY LOST IN TRANSLATION 87
ernment could, for example, levy a cigarette
tax equal to the amount of added health care
costs to society so that consumers consider
these costs when deciding to smoke.  This
measure would decrease smoking rates.  Gov-
ernment could also require warning labels on
cigarette packets to inform consumers.  Pass it
on.
Member of Congress:2 The tobacco market does not function properly.
We should tax cigarettes so smokers consider
the healthcare costs of smoking.  We should
also require graphic warning labels on ciga-
rettes so consumers are informed.  Maybe we
should punish cigarette companies for lying to
smokers in the past.  Pass it on.
FDA: No one should smoke.  The deceitful tobacco
industry causes some people to smoke.  Taxing
cigarettes is not doing enough to reduce smok-
ing; we should put graphic warning labels on
cigarettes.  Also, “[g]raphic health warnings
promote greater understanding of the health
risks of smoking and would help to reduce
consumption.”3  Pass it on.
D.C. Circuit: “The only explicitly asserted [government]
interest . . . is an interest in reducing smoking
rates.”4  The FDA’s interest in “ ‘effectively
communicating’ the health risks of smoking is
merely a description of the means by which it
plans to accomplish its goal of reducing smok-
ing rates, and not an independent inter-
est . . . .”5  Moreover, the government’s
“attempt to reformulate its interest as purely
informational is unconvincing, as an interest in
‘effective’ communication is too vague to
stand on its own.”6
2 See, e.g., The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1333, Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776, 1844 (2009).
3 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628
(June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141) [hereinafter Final Rule].
4 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
5 Id. at 1221.
6 Id.
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In most pass it on games, the final story contains modified descrip-
tive words while retaining its original underlying theme.  However, as
the example above demonstrates, the Government-Interest-in-the-To-
bacco-Industry version of the pass it on game results in the underlying
theme becoming twisted and totally changed.  Unlike most pass it on
games, which are hypothetical, this game is real and has real conse-
quences.  The recently decided R.J. Reynolds v. FDA case seemed to play
out like a pass it on game, in which the original underlying theme of the
graphic images disappeared as it made its way from Economist to the
D.C. Circuit.  The result was that clearly defined economic theory was
lost in translation.
Congress passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Con-
trol Act (the Act) in 2009, which enabled the FDA to select graphic
images to cover fifty percent of the front and rear panels of every ciga-
rette pack.7  The nine images the FDA selected are shown in Figure 1
below.  Following the FDA’s Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages
and Advertisements (Final Rule), tobacco companies brought two cases
challenging the graphic image requirements on First Amendment free
speech grounds.  In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United
States the Sixth Circuit ruled that the graphic images were constitu-
tional.8  However, in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, the D.C. Circuit
ruled the graphic images unconstitutional,9 thereby establishing a circuit
split.10  Although the losing plaintiffs in Discount Tobacco filed for re-
view by the Supreme Court (which the Court declined), the FDA did not
appeal R.J. Reynolds Tobacco.  Yet, the question remains: how did the
D.C. Circuit reason so very differently than the Sixth Circuit?
To determine the government’s interests, the D.C. Circuit relied on
both the Act and the FDA’s final rule.  Unlike pass it on games, there
were no relay stages where the content of the economic story could have
been skewed through incorrect reporting by the listener.  Thus, the D.C.
Circuit had no excuse to err in uncovering the government’s interest.
Economics defines the so-called market failures in the tobacco industry
and instructs the government to correct such failures through market in-
tervention.  Yet, accepting complex First Amendment arguments, the
D.C. Circuit ignored obvious market failures and ultimately contradicted
the original theory behind the adoption of the requirements.11  It over-
7 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2009).
8 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
9 696 F.3d at 1205.
10 See American Snuff Company, LLC v. United States (6th Cir. 2012), petition for cert.
filed, (U.S. Nov. 26, 2012) (No.12-521).
11 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1229 (“The government’s attempt to reformulate its interest
as purely informational is unconvincing, as an interest in ‘effective’ communication is too
vague to stand on its own.”).
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looked the fact that economic theory clearly defines the two governmen-
tal interests of reducing smoking and the separate interest of informing
consumers of the health risks of smoking.12
FIGURE 1: THE THE NINE FDA PROPOSED HEALTH WARNINGS
REQUIRED ON CIGARETTE LABELS13
Reconciling the First Amendment legal standards with the empirical
economic support for the specific question at issue is a daunting task.  On
the one hand, compelled commercial speech is a doctrinal mess requiring
courts to determine which of three legal standards applies to each gov-
ernmental interest.14  On the other hand, courts must also determine
12 See A. MAS-COLELL, M. WHINSTON & J. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 312
(1995) [hereinafter MWG].
13 Required Warning for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524,
69,525 (Nov. 12, 2010).
14 As I discuss in Part II, infra, the Court could apply one of the three following stan-
dards to determine whether the graphic image requirements are constitutional: (1) the lenient
Zauderer standard under Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Superior Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); (2) the Central Hudson standard under Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); or (3) the
strict Wooley standard under Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716–14 (1977).  The Zauderer
standard only applies to an interest in preventing consumer deception that constitutional law,
not economics, defines.  The Central Hudson and Wooley standards potentially apply to both
of the government’s interests (in reducing smoking and providing information to consumers).
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which empirical economic studies apply to the various governmental in-
terests under the different legal standards.15  This consolidation effort is
similar to the communication between two people who do not speak a
common language.  While lawyers distinguish among the legal standards
and economists distinguish among the empirical studies, courts are left to
translate and condense both legal and economic arguments into a coher-
ent message.  The complexity of the legal and economic arguments often
obscures the point and courts can lose track of governmental interests
altogether.  In the end, what was once clearly defined economic theory
gets lost in translation.
To most non-economists, graphic image requirements are not what
they appear to be.  Graphic image requirements do not merely aim to
reduce smoking, but also seek to inform consumers.16  Reconciling this
difference is paramount.  Yet, courts ignore the second interest of in-
forming consumers and apply First Amendment law only to the govern-
ment’s interest in reducing smoking.17  This Article will explain the
importance of separating the two governmental interests in the graphic
image requirements and consolidate the economic and legal theory in
analyzing these interests.18  As simple as it may seem, the D.C. Circuit in
Reynolds ignored the government’s interest in providing information.19
This Article sets up a game-theoretic model of the compelled commercial
speech doctrine based on these governmental interests and uses Bayesian
inference to make assumptions about how the Supreme Court would rule
if it hears a similar case.
Ultimately, the constitutionality of graphic image requirements will
depend on whether they are a form of information or a form of com-
pelled ideology.20  Under the First Amendment, the specific question is
Whether the Court applies the Wooley strict scrutiny standard over the Central Hudson inter-
mediate scrutiny standard depends on whether it finds the graphic images to be more ideologi-
cal rather than informational in nature. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713–14.
15 Many of the arguments in the Final Rule were made in the context of administrative
law, where the requirements to pass regulations are much different and are unsuited to the
context of First Amendment law. See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,636.
16 See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,635.
17 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
18 In doing so, this Article will analyze the problems that arise when the government
relies on empirical evidence to demonstrate its interest in informing consumers.  The govern-
ment’s interest in reducing smoking is determined by using empirical evidence, i.e., arguments
for or against a policy that are based on conclusions drawn from data-driven economic re-
search.  As Part IV of this Article explains, while empirical evidence analyzing whether
graphic images reduce smoking exists, the evidence is limited in regards to whether graphic
images actually inform consumers.
19 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1229.
20 If the Court finds the graphic images to be a form of information so that the Central
Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard applies, the labels should be held constitutional.  If the
Court finds the graphic images to be a form of speech that says “smoking is disgusting” or the
value judgment suggesting that no one should ever smoke so that the Wooley strict scrutiny
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whether the graphic images are a form of information provided to con-
sumers, like falling stick figures on warning signs reading “CAUTION:
WET FLOOR,” or a form of compelled speech, like requiring all automo-
biles to display license plates that say “Live Free or Die.”21  On one
hand, graphic images could help to better communicate the information
already relayed through a particular textual statement.22  On the other
hand, the graphic images could communicate the opinion that smoking is
disgusting or the value judgment that no one should ever smoke.  It is
important to point out that graphic images may simultaneously perform
both an informing and an association function.23  However, First Amend-
ment law requires a determination to be made regarding whether graphic
images are ideologically neutral.24  Analyzing the graphic images in this
light presents a court with a new legal issue: At what point do more
salient forms of otherwise ideologically neutral information become
compelled ideology?25
This is the first article to investigate this question.26  The author
acknowledges that this Article takes a law-and-economics maximalist ap-
proach in the sense that it assumes that the tools of economic analysis
can capture all of the relevant considerations.  It is important to point out
that fixing economically-defined market failures is by no means the only
justification for government intervention in the marketplace.27  However,
standard applies, the labels should be held unconstitutional.  Solving the model by forward
induction yields the prediction that the constitutionality of the graphic image requirements will
depend on whether the images are ideologically neutral. See discussion infra Part III.
21 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977).  By setting up and solving a game-
theoretic model of the compelled commercial speech doctrine, this Article predicts that the
constitutionality of the graphic image requirements will depend on whether the images are
ideologically neutral. See discussion infra Part III.
22 Lower courts have disagreed on this issue.  The Sixth Circuit considered the graphic
images to be “purely factual” information in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. United
States, 674 F.3d 509, 528 (6th Cir. 2012).  However, in Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216–17, the
D.C. Circuit considered the images to be information, but not purely factual.  Moreover, the
D.C. District Court considered the images to be a form of compelled speech in R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, No. 1:11-cv-01482 (D.D.C. 2011).
23 See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE
OUR DECISIONS (2010).
24 See Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum, 19
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 236 (2012).
25 The Sixth Circuit pointed this out in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, 674 F.3d at
528 (“The requirement imposed by the FSPTCA—that a product manufacturer place a large
scale color graphic on a product warning label—is simply unprecedented.”).
26 This issue has come to the forefront, in part, because the novel New York City law
requiring all food providers with over fifteen locations to publically post the number of calo-
ries in their foods has expanded across the U.S. in both location and form. See Food Prepara-
tions and Food Establishments, New York City Health Code § 81.50 (1996).  For example, can
the government require calorie labeling based on a recommended 2,000 calorie diet (which
may be considered a point of view)?
27 One commonly addressed governmental interest that appears relevant to graphic im-
age requirements but is not analyzed in this Article directly is the government’s interest in
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this Article addresses the relevant justifications for government interven-
tion into the marketplace implicitly in its economic approach.  For exam-
ple, by giving greater deference to commercial speech regulation
designed to protect minors rather than adults, this Article mimics the
Supreme Court by integrating the government’s interest in protecting mi-
nors from harmful materials28 and its interest in providing information.29
This Article treats non-economic considerations as secondary for the
simple reason that Congress was motivated by the information market
failure when it passed the graphic image regulation.30  For the straight-
forward reason that attempting to cure a market failure is an economic
question, I defend my use of this law-and-economics lens.
Part I of this Article examines the economic underpinnings of the
two governmental interests in the tobacco industry, including what gov-
ernments should do when addressing those interests.  Part I also explores
how advertising can affect consumers’ decisions to smoke.  Part II
briefly presents the modern compelled commercial speech doctrine.  Part
III uses a game-theoretic model to help analyze which economic argu-
ments should and should not be used in the various legal tests.  Part III
then analyzes the main issue which could eventually reach the Supreme
Court: Whether graphic image requirements are a form of information or
a form of compelled ideology.  Part III also proposes using a new test
promoting the health of citizens. See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,629 (“The U.S. Govern-
ment has a substantial interest in reducing the number of Americans, particularly children and
adolescents, who use cigarettes and other tobacco products in order to prevent the life-threat-
ening health consequences associated with tobacco use.”).  However, it is discussed indirectly
by investigating whether graphic images reduce smoking. See discussion infra Part IV.
28 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized an independent interest in protecting
minors from harmful materials such as tobacco. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744–45 (1996) (upholding cable television restrictions
as a means of protecting children from indecent programming); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 749 (1979) (upholding the FCC finding that indecent speech during an afternoon
broadcast when children are listening should be restricted); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 636 (1968) (rejecting the assertion that “the scope of the constitutional freedom of expres-
sion . . . cannot be made to depend on whether the citizen is an adult or a minor”).
29 See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 357
(2008) (“[F]or example, [the Supreme Court has] distinguished between alcoholic beverage
advertisements targeted to adults and those targeted to children.”).  This interest will ultimately
play a crucial role in justifying the images under the information market failure because the
images will have differential impacts across different groups of citizens such as children. See
discussion infra Part IV.
30 The Institution of Medicine has found the warnings in place to be “unnoticed and
stale” and the Department of Health and Human Services notes that they have failed to “con-
vey relevant information in an effective way.” See Institute of Medicine Report 2007, 75 FR
69524, at 291 [hereinafter IOM].  This has continuously been the case ever since the first
regulations in the 1950s.  In the graphic image regulation, for example, this motivation can be
seen when the Final Rule states that “the existing cigarette health warnings are given little
attention or consideration by viewers.” See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,629.  This is ex-
actly the same information market failure Congress has attempted to cure over the past fifty
years.
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based on behavioral economics to answer that question.  Part V is the
conclusion.
I. ECONOMICS BACKGROUND
Most of the time, markets operate efficiently and government inter-
vention is not required.31  Then, one may ask, why does the government
heavily regulate the tobacco industry and not, for example, the fruit in-
dustry?  Because the tobacco industry differs from most other industries
in two important ways that justify government intervention.32
The first difference between the tobacco industry and other indus-
tries is that consumers do not consider the societal costs of smoking
when deciding to smoke.  For example, many smokers do not consider
how smoking increases costs to government health care programs or how
it increases the health risks of nonsmokers through secondhand smoke.33
Instead, consumers only consider the internal costs of cigarettes when
deciding whether to smoke.34  In general, when the purchaser of a good
does not consider the external costs associated with that good, the gov-
ernment should intervene and force consumers to consider the conse-
quences of using the product.35  Cigarette taxes are in this sense similar
to environmental taxes.  Like the environmental taxes imposed on manu-
facturers to make them consider pollution when deciding, for example,
how many goods to produce and how to produce those goods, cigarette
taxes are imposed on smokers so that they are forced to consider today
how smoking increases health care expenditures in the future.
The second characteristic differentiating the tobacco industry from
the fruit industry is that consumers lack relevant information about
smoking.  For example, without intervention, consumers may not be
fully informed of the consequences of smoking, such as the probability
that they will die from smoking-related cancer or the fact that smoking
slows healing time in recovering from other illnesses.  Government inter-
vention is required so that consumers can make informed decisions about
smoking.  Therefore, the government should intervene in the market to
either provide that information directly or require tobacco companies to
disclose the information.36  The government interest here is not per se
whether consumers smoke after having all the information about smok-
ing; the government interest is in guaranteeing that consumers have the
31 See MWG, supra note 12, at 312.
32 See id. at 315.
33 See Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 99.
34 See id. at 104.  These internal costs may not include certain hidden costs to the
smoker, but these hidden costs are not the focus with this market failure.
35 However, governments should intervene in the presence of market failures when the
benefits exceed the costs of the intervention. See MWG, supra note 12, at 368.
36 See id. at 231.
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information in the first place.  Compare this to buying a car without
knowing its gas mileage or safety rating.  Even knowing that an SUV
gets lower than average miles per gallon or that a sports car is less safe
than a sedan, consumers still decide to purchase them.  It seems apparent
that consumers will only purchase a vehicle after knowing the gas mile-
age, but unlike buying cars, smokers will purchase cigarettes without
knowing their nicotine, tar, or carbon monoxide content.  Unlike SUV
owners who today feel the impact of high fuel expenditures on their bank
account, cigarette consumers cannot measure the potential costs of smok-
ing until years down the road.37
Economics refers to these two differences in the tobacco industry as
market failures.38  The name derives from the fact that if government
leaves the tobacco industry alone, the market fails to lead to the socially
optimal level of smoking.  As a result, too much smoking occurs.  The
sections that follow explain why we care about these two market failures
and provide insight on why and how the government should address
them.  The importance of reviewing these basic concepts may not be-
come immediately apparent.  But after reading these sections and review-
ing the Reynolds decision, the importance in highlighting these market
failures will become evident.39  While the first market failure—that
smokers do not consider external costs of smoking—settles intuitively
with most people; some people, especially lawmakers, courts, and law-
yers seem to forget or fail to appreciate the importance of the second
market failure—that smokers lack information when deciding to smoke.
As simple as it may seem at first glance, even the FDA missed this inter-
est in its Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA).40  Comment 214 addressed
this error, and the FDA responded in its Final Rule.41  Nonetheless, the
37 See Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 138.
38 See, e.g., MWG, supra note 12, at 12.
39 See generally R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
40 Federal agencies (such as the FDA) are required under Executive Order 12866 to
conduct a regulatory impact analysis (RIA) of all major regulations.  RIAs amount to a cost-
benefit analysis, which is somewhat similar to the Central Hudson “directly advancement”
test.  In RIAs, the agencies weigh the relevant market failures and other justifications against
the downside of the regulations (in this case the impact on tobacco companies’ First Amend-
ment rights).  RIAs also require agencies to assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory
alternatives when it selects a regulation to maximize net benefits.
41 See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,709.  Comment 214 pointed out that the FDA failed
to discuss the economic rationale for the rule.  Specifically, the Comment noted that in its RIA,
the FDA failed to identify which market failure the graphic images addressed.  As the FDA
pointed out in its Final Rule, “[t]he comment went on to state that warning labels are a means
of disseminating information, and if consumers are already fully informed about a particular
product, there can be no increase in consumer welfare due to the addition or revision of a
warning label.”  In response, the FDA said, “[a]n absence of adequate information is a well-
established market failure, one which provides a rationale for disclosure requirements.”
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-1\CJP103.txt unknown Seq: 11 20-NOV-13 15:25
2013] ECONOMIC THEORY LOST IN TRANSLATION 95
D.C. Circuit in Reynolds ignored the government’s interest in providing
information.42
A. What Do Cigarette Prices Have to Do with Smoking?
Eating apples does not come with external costs.  Eating apples does
not require Medicare to pay for cancer treatment that it caused, nor does
it require the governmental disability program to pay for extended bene-
fits because apples  prevented people from healing properly from an ill-
ness.  Smoking does.43  One cure for this market failure is to tax a
cigarette pack an amount equal to the costs of the negative side effects
from that pack and use the revenue to pay for the increased external
healthcare costs.44
By forcing consumers to pay for all the external costs of smoking
through cigarette taxes, a remarkable phenomenon occurs.45  This phe-
nomenon is the single largest misconception about cigarette taxation and
smoking.46  Some people say that because smoking is addictive, higher
cigarette prices will not decrease instances of smoking or smoking rates.
However, this is not so.  Higher prices do cause some smokers to quit,
decrease smoking rates, and lead to large decreases in the probability of
initiation by non-smokers.47
42 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1229.
43 See Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 96.
44 See id. at 165.  In economic terms, one would say “[t]o internalize the externalities
associated with smoking it is clear that cigarettes should be taxed.”  This is called a “Pigouvian
tax.” See generally W. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 61 AM. ECON.
REV. 307 (1972) (arguing that Pigouvian taxes, or subsidies, imposed upon the generator of a
particular externality are the best means of curbing that externality).
45 Cigarette taxes should be set by including associated health care costs of smoking,
which would mean that taxes should be increased. See F. SLOAN ET AL., THE PRICE OF SMOK-
ING 101 (2004) [hereinafter SLOAN] .  However, economists cannot agree on the health care
costs associated with smoking a pack of cigarettes.  The suggested health care costs per pack
of cigarettes ranges from $0.15 to $1.44. See id; see also WILLARD G. MANNING ET AL., THE
COSTS OF POOR HEALTH HABITS 127 (1991).  When the government raises taxes on cigarettes,
however, tobacco companies raise the price of cigarettes more than just the cost of the tax,
which is called tax passing.  The term in economics is that taxes are “over-shifted.” See Caw-
ley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 166.  Tax passing may be justified for tobacco companies to
maintain profits in light of an increase in cigarette taxes, i.e., they must increase profits per
pack of cigarettes because people respond to a tax increase by smoking less. See Frank
Chaloupka & Kenneth Warner, in The Economics of Smoking, 1B HANDBOOK OF HEALTH
ECON. 1567 (Anthony J. Culver & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000).  The extent of the tax
passing, which exceeds 100% at times, cannot be ignored by consumers. Id.  Another poten-
tial problem is that consumers do not consider some internal costs of smoking, such as the
amount of time spent smoking.  If states force consumers to internalize these costs, the tax per
pack of cigarette could be as high as $32.78. See SLOAN ET AL., supra, at 101.
46 See, e.g., Baumol, supra note 44, at 322.
47 See Donna Gilleskie & Koleman Strumpf, The Behavioral Dynamics of Youth Smok-
ing, 40 J. HUM. RES. 822, 823 (2005).  Prior to 1988, even economists thought that addicts
were irrational and therefore unresponsive to incentives such as price. See John Cawley,
Reefer Madness, Frank the Tank or Pretty Woman: To what Extent do Addictive Behaviors
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The amount by which cigarette prices must be increased to decrease
smoking rates is much lower than economists once thought.48  Three dif-
ferent questions address the extent to which price matters.  First, at what
price do smokers cut back on smoking?  Second, at what price do smok-
ers quit smoking altogether?  Third, what price prevents non-smokers
from initiating smoking?  These are all interesting questions, and the an-
swer to all of these is that we do not know with exact certainty and that
the prices vary from person to person.  However, some studies do esti-
mate the effects of price increases within ranges.49  A five percent in-
crease in price is estimated to reduce the number of cigarette packs
purchased by 1.5%–2.5%.50  The consensus among economists is
2.5%.51  That means that if the price of a pack of cigarettes originally
costing $6 is raised to $7.25, an estimated one out of every ten cigarette
packs would no longer be purchased.  In terms of price increases needed
to induce smoking cessation and prevent smoking initiation, a five per-
cent increase in cigarette taxes is estimated to reduce 2%–3.5% of the
total number of years spent smoking.52  In 1998, for example, an increase
in cigarette taxes by $0.43 per pack (nearly twenty percent) reduced
youth smoking rates by thirteen percent,53 adult smoking rates by five
percent,54 and pregnant women smoking rates by less than three
percent.55
Economic studies indicate that how smokers respond to price in-
creases depends on certain demographic characteristics.  Men respond
more to prices than women, and pregnant women respond differently to
prices than non-pregnant women.56  In terms of smoking initiation, prices
Respond to Incentives?, in INCENTIVES AND CHOICE IN HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 7 (Frank
Sloan & Hirschel Kasper eds., 2008).  After the breakthrough introduction of the theory of
rational addiction (TORA) was used to model how addicts buy addicting goods, such as ciga-
rettes, numerous studies provide evidence that smokers do in fact respond to prices. See, e.g.,
Gary Becker & Kevin Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675 (1988).
48 See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 101.
49 For two summaries on this issue, see Chaloupka & Warner, supra note 45, at 1539,
1546–47, and Craig Gallet & John List, Cigarette Demand: A Meta-Analysis of Elasticities, 12
HEALTH ECON. 821, 821-3 (2003).
50 See Chaloupka & Warner, supra note 45, at 1540 (noting the price elasticity for over-
all cigarette demand is in the range of -0.3 to -0.5).
51 See Gilleskie & Strumpf, supra note 47, at 822; see also Michael Grossman, Individ-
ual Behaviours and Substance Use: The Role of Price, in 16 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOM-
ICS AND HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 15, 16 (Bjo¨rn Lindgren & Michael Grossman eds.,
2005).
52 See Martin Forster & Andrew Jones, The Role of Tobacco Taxes in Starting and Quit-
ting Smoking: Duration Analysis of British Data, 164 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 517, 518 (2001).
53 See id. at 518.
54 See SLOAN, supra note 45, at 101.
55 See Douglas E. Levy & Ellen Meara, The Effect of the 1998 Master Settlement Agree-
ment on Prenatal Smoking, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 276, 277 (2006).
56 See Gallet & List, supra note 49, at 822.
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do not impact youth, especially girls, as much as adults.57  Also, higher
prices reduce heavy smoking58 more than light smoking.59  In addition,
higher prices decrease the demand for cigarettes for teens and young
adults less than for adults.60  This heterogeneity of consumer response to
taxation complicates to prospect of determining an optimal cigarette
tax.61  Another response that complicates using cigarette taxes to cure the
externalities market failure is compensating behaviors by smokers.  That
is, when cigarette taxes are raised, smokers react in ways that defeat the
purpose of taxing cigarettes in the first place.  Studies have found that
when cigarette prices increase, smokers may switch to cigarettes with
higher tar content per cigarette62 and extract more nicotine per cigarette
by taking longer drags on cigarettes, reducing the idle time between
puffs, increasing the degree and length of inhalation, blocking filter
holes, and smoking the cigarette further down to the butt.63  The govern-
ment can use a few alternatives in attempts to prevent this compensating
behavior, which may also help cure the externalities market failure.64
Placing restrictions on the purchase or use of cigarettes is one possible
way to reduce smoking.65  For example, age restrictions, such as laws
57 See Philip DeCicca, Donald Kenkel & Alan Mathios, Putting Out the Fires: Will
Higher Taxes Reduce the Onset of Youth Smoking?, 110 J. POL. ECON. 144, 145 (2002).  For
the difference between boys and girls, see John Cawley, S. Markowitz & John Tauras, Light-
ing Up and Slimming Down: The Effects of Body Weight and Cigarette Prices on Adolescent
Smoking Initiation, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 293, 294 (2004).
58 Heavy smoking is defined as smoking eleven or more cigarettes per day. See Cawley
et. al., supra note 57.
59 Light smoking is defined as smoking between six and ten cigarettes per day. See id.
60 See D. Kenkel, Health Behaviours Among Young People, in 6 THE ELGAR COMPANION
TO HEALTH ECONOMICS 60 (2006).
61 See Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 166 (citing HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE
(6th ed. 2002)).  The regressive impact of cigarette taxation is a further complicating factor—
the same tax costs lower-income individuals proportionately more than it does higher-income
individuals. See id.  For example, in a recent study released in September 2012, low-income
smokers in New York were found to spend 25% of their income on cigarettes, while wealthier
smokers were found to spend only 2% of their income on cigarettes. See Poor Smokers in New
York State Spend 25% of Income on Cigarettes, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/nyregion/poor-smokers-in-new-york-state-spend-25-of-in
come-on-cigarettes-study-says.html?_r=0.
62 See M. C. Farrelly et al., The Effects of Higher Cigarette Prices on Tar and Nicotine
Consumption in a Cohort of Adult Smokers, 13 HEALTH ECON. 49, 53–54 (2004).
63 See Je´roˆme Adda & Francesca Cornaglia, Taxes, Cigarette Consumption, and Smok-
ing Intensity, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1013, 1014 (2006).  This study is controversial.  A Comment
on this study questioned the findings. See Jason Abrevaya & Laura Puzzello, Taxes, Cigarette
Consumption, and Smoking Intensity: Comment, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1751 (2012).
64 See William N. Evans & Mathew C. Farrelly, The Compensating Behavior of Smok-
ers: Taxes, Tar, and Nicotine, 29 RAND J. ECON. 578, 579 (1998).  The government can take
action in response to the consumer’s response.  By modifying how consumers perceive the tax,
the government can decrease consumer responses to tax increases. See Raj Chetty et al., Sali-
ence and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1145–46 (2009).
65 Place restrictions (commonly known as clean indoor air laws), such as laws barring
smoking in public places, bars, and workplaces, are known to reduce smoking rates. See
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barring underage smoking, have been estimated to decrease younger teen
participation, but may have no effect on older teens and young adult
smokers.66  Apart from a few alternative methods, cigarette taxes are the
main route the government takes to cure the externalities market failure.
Forcing consumers to consider the hidden costs of smoking when
deciding to smoke turns out to be difficult.  Nonetheless, many times
intervention is needed to help consumers consider the consequences of
using tobacco.  Deciding how to do this most effectively depends on how
knowledgeable consumers are and the role of information in deciding to
smoke.  The next section addresses the government’s interest in guaran-
teeing that consumers are adequately informed about the risks of smok-
ing.  While these two government interests are separate, the overlap
between the role of information in deciding to smoke muddies their
division.
B. Why Do Some Doctors Smoke?
In an efficient marketplace, consumers are able to obtain all the in-
formation they need to make purchasing decisions.67  Fully informed
consumers are able to weigh the costs of purchasing and using a product
against the benefits it provides.  They consume the product if the benefits
outweigh the costs.  Otherwise, the product is not consumed.  When mar-
kets are open, society usually assumes that the truths about products will
be discovered in the long run.68  Thus, the open marketplace is usually
efficient.  With some products, however, necessary information cannot
be easily discovered.  In those circumstances, consumers cannot weigh
the benefits against the costs, the efficient result does not occur, and ei-
ther too much or too little of a product is consumed.69  In the tobacco
market, many smokers lack the information needed to accurately assess
Chaloupka & Warner, supra note 45, at 1596.  The effectiveness of clean indoor air laws have
been shown to vary by industry.  Industries with prevalent smoking, such as bartending, have
larger reductions in smoking than other industries where smoking was not prevalent before-
hand, such as in schools or in the government. See Marianna P. Bitler et al., Effects of Venue-
Specific State Clean Indoor Air Laws on Smoking-Related Outcomes, 19 HEALTH ECON. 1425,
1426 (2010).  Clean indoor laws address the problem of secondhand smoke as opposed to
reducing smoking.  As such, reductions in smoking in public places do not significantly reduce
smoking rates because smoking is displaced to private places.  There are conflicting studies in
this area. Compare Je´roˆme Adda & Francesca Cornaglia, The Effect of Bans and Taxes on
Passive Smoking, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1, 2 (2010); with Christopher Carpenter et
al., Public-Place Smoking Laws and Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS), 3 AM.
ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y 35, 35 (2011).
66 See John Tauras et al., Tobacco Control Policies and Youth Smoking: Evidence from a
New Era, in 16 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 277, 277
(2005).
67 See MWG, supra note 12, at 390.
68 See GOSTIN, supra note 29, at 150.
69 See MWG, supra note 12, at 400.
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the costs of smoking.  Therefore, government intervention, by way of
directly providing the missing information or requiring cigarette compa-
nies to disclose the information, is justified under an efficiency
rationale.70
Society takes a public health perspective on smoking and argues
that no one should smoke under any circumstances.  Economists, on the
other hand, determine an ideal amount of smoking to be above zero be-
cause—as much as society does not care to admit—smoking has bene-
fits.  I am not talking about health benefits because, despite 1950s
tobacco advertising, we all know this to be false.71  The benefits of
smoking are social: smoking with friends is fun and nicotine feels good.
Why else would your doctor smoke knowing its harms unless he or she
enjoys it?  Economists look at how much someone enjoys smoking and
contend that they smoke only if the total benefits outweigh the total
harms.  When employing this method, economists set the number of peo-
ple who should smoke above zero.  While this thinking may seem im-
moral, we should not fail to consider the social benefits of smoking.  One
obvious question becomes how many people derive happiness from
smoking that, for them, exceeds the costs?  The answer is that we do not
know for sure because many people lack information about the risks and
consequences of smoking.  However, if we assume that medical doctors
have full information about smoking, then we know at least the portion
of medical doctors who choose to smoke decide the benefits they attain
from smoking outweigh the harms.72  According to a 2011 poll, approxi-
mately two percent of physicians smoke.73  Considering this low smok-
ing prevalence among physicians, the second obvious question is
whether the eighteen percent smoking prevalence among non-physi-
cians74 is higher than the two percent prevalence of physicians because
of inadequate information.  Again, the answer is that we do not know.
But considering the difference in access to medical information between
physicians and the general public, it is fair to assume that inadequate
access to information plays a role.
70 See id. at 370.
71 See discussion infra Part IV.
72 See Donald S. Kenkel, Health Behavior, Health Knowledge and Schooling, 99 J. POL.
ECON. 287, 288 (1991).
73 Carol Peckham, Medscape Physician Lifestyle Report: 2012 Results, MEDSCAPE.COM,
http://www.medscape.com/features/slideshow/lifestyle/2012/public (last visited Aug. 17,
2013).
74 Healthy and Unhealthy Behavior and Lifestyle Trends: No Significant Change in 2011
in Proportions of Adults Who Are Obese, Smoke or Wear Seatbelts, HARRIS INTERACTIVE 1, 1
(May 25, 2011), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/HI-Harris-Poll-Healthy-Behaviors-
2011-05-25.pdf.
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Even with accurate information on the health consequences of
smoking, smokers underestimate their personal risks75 and underestimate
the probability that they will become addicts.76  Therefore, the govern-
ment may be justified in providing different information, educating con-
sumers, or participating in counter-advertising to prevent consumers
from misinterpreting how the facts apply to them.77  Proponents of
graphic images on cigarette packs may argue that if the government con-
tinues to provide information to consumers through various means, con-
sumers will eventually truly understand how the adverse health
consequences of smoking apply to them.  However, evidence suggests
this is not necessarily so.  Many smokers will not personalize the risks
“unless there is clear evidence that [smoking] is negatively affecting their
own health.”78  While this notion is concerning from a policy perspec-
tive, many can relate to it.  Many of us know of the Grandma Jeanie,
Aunt Kim, or brother Matt who—twenty years too late—stopped smok-
ing when diagnosed with lung cancer.
We should not ignore the social benefits of smoking and blame ad-
diction as the only reason people smoke.79  It is true that addiction com-
plicates the tradeoff between social benefits of smoking and the costs of
smoking.80  Yet, regardless of the role addiction plays in smoking, it is
critical to understand that the government is justified in providing infor-
75 See GOSTIN, supra note 29, at 138.  This is known as “optimism bias.”
76 See Athanasios Orphanides & David Zervos, Rational Addiction with Learning and
Regret, 103 J. POL. ECON. 739, 740 (1995).
77 Id. at 740.
78 See V. Kerry Smith et al., Do Smokers Respond to Health Shocks?, 83 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 675, 676 (2001).
79 Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 141.
80 Before 1988, addiction was thought to be irrational and therefore impossible to ana-
lyze under the standard rational optimization framework typically used in economics, which
assumes that a rational person is able to formulate a consistent plan to maximize utility over
time.  Under this framework, “a good could be addictive to some persons but not others, and a
person could be addicted to some goods but not to other goods.”  See Becker & Murphy, supra
note 47, at 676.  Because of this mindset, research before 1988 focused on aspects of addiction
which were more backward looking, i.e., consumption depends on the path of past consump-
tion, such as habit formation or reinforcement.  The now standard approach to model addiction
is the theory of rational addiction from the seminal 1988 paper by Gary Becker and Kevin
Murphy. See id.  Under the model, addiction has two traits, reinforcement and tolerance,
where the former means that “greater consumption of a good raises its future consumption”
and latter means that “given levels of consumption are less satisfying when past consumption
has been greater.”  Id.  The theory of rational addiction posits that even forward-looking smok-
ers with stable preferences (i.e., consider both current the monetary price of cigarettes and the
cost of future addiction) can optimally choose to smoke (or consume other addictive goods).
See Becker & Murphy, supra note 47, at 676; see also Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, Is
Addiction “Rational”?  Theory and Evidence, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1261, 1262 (2001) (“we pro-
vide new and convincing evidence that smokers are forward-looking in their smoking deci-
sions, using state excise tax increases that have been legislatively enacted but are not yet
effective, and monthly data on consumption.”)
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mation to consumers even if providing the information does not necessa-
rily reduce smoking.  Many lawmakers, judges, and lawyers overlook
this market failure.  For example, the D.C. Circuit in Reynolds stated
“[t]he government’s attempt to reformulate its interest as purely informa-
tional is unconvincing, as an interest in ‘effective’ communication is too
vague to stand on its own.”81  Lawmakers, judges, and lawyers must ap-
preciate that the government is justified in providing the missing infor-
mation.  This justification does not necessarily depend on whether we
can measure how smokers respond to the newly acquired information
through empirical research.  While the government can attempt to con-
vince people not to smoke through anti-smoking campaigns, it should
also inform.82  The information market failure does not exist for those
doctors who choose to smoke and know the health effects of smoking,
but rather for the uninformed.
C. Why Does the Government Restrict Tobacco Advertisements?
The information market failure perspective takes the consumer’s
point of view and asks whether the consumer has all the information he
or she needs when he or she decides to smoke.  To provide information
to the consumer, the government can either provide information itself
through anti-smoking advertising or require the tobacco companies to
disclose the missing information.  The First Amendment takes the to-
bacco companies’ point of view and asks whether tobacco companies’
free speech is violated when the government requires them to disclose
different types of material on their products.  Acknowledging that these
two points of view exist, it is important to distinguish between how regu-
lation can infringe on the tobacco companies’ free speech—the topic of
the next section—and how regulation helps inform consumers—the topic
of this section.
Does advertising cure or worsen the information market failure?
Most of the time, we should only be skeptical of advertising when the
quality of a good is unknown to consumers.83  When a good’s quality is
well-known, advertising usually focuses on prices and availability,
neither of which worsen the information market failure.84  When a
good’s quality can only be determined upon consumption, advertising
can worsen the market failure, especially if it excludes factual informa-
tion or price.85  In addition, for those goods whose qualities are difficult
81 Reynolds, 696 F.3d 1205, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
82 See GOSTIN, supra note 29, at 351.
83 See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA-
TION 159 (Denis Clinton et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2000) [hereinafter IO].
84 These are known in economics as “search goods.” Id. at 454.
85 These are known in economics as “experience goods.” Id.
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to evaluate even after consumption, the potential for advertising worsen-
ing the market failure is at its highest, because it is in this case that
companies benefit the most from deceptive advertising.86
To illustrate why we should be skeptical about the advertising of
some goods and not others, consider purchasing cigarettes versus
purchasing movies.  The quality of a movie can be immediately judged
by advertising; it is high quality if it is a Blu-ray, lower quality if it is a
DVD, and of the lowest quality if it is a VHS.87  Consumers know what
to expect from the Blu-ray, DVD, and VHS formats, so any advertising
campaign suggesting that a DVD is better quality than a Blu-ray disk
would be nonsensical.88  Government intervention is not needed to tell
consumers that this sort of advertising is ridiculous.  As such, advertising
for movies usually deals with price and location.  Cigarettes are not like
movies in this sense.  The quality of a cigarette cannot be immediately
judged by advertising or even directly after consumption.89
In addition to these quality concerns, cigarette advertising also
presents a different, and larger, concern.  Cigarette advertising may be
more detrimental to society if it expands the market by convincing new
people to begin smoking90 than if it simply results in smokers switching
brands.91  Whether this is true or not, society often singles out advertis-
ing as one of the reasons people smoke.92  To support this notion, people
argue that the U.S. tobacco industry would not spend more than $1 bil-
lion annually on advertising if it did not increase cigarette sales.93  As a
result, a common response to reduce smoking is to “ban or regulate to-
86 See Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 128.
87 One main reason the quality of a movie is known to consumers is that product stan-
dards are in place.  With cigarettes, however, no such standards for exist for some aspects of
the cigarette, such as menthol content.  For a review of the benefits of standards and how
technical standards are set, see Kyle Rozema, Modifying RAND Commitments to Better Price
Patents in the Standards Setting Context, 6 J. BUS. ENT. & L. 23 (2012).
88 There is a question of whether standards should be set in the tobacco industry so that
cigarette companies can more easily advertise cigarettes as light, ultra light, or low tar.  To-
bacco companies advertising is currently restrained to a great degree, including regulations
that restrict companies from advertising that cigarettes are “light” or low in tar and nicotine.
See GOSTIN, supra note 29, at 350.
89 See Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 128.
90 This is known in economics as “cooperative advertising.” Id. at 180.
91 This is known in economics as “competitive advertising.” Id. at 181.
92 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS [501] (1989), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/
access/NNBBXS.pdf; see also CDC, Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People—A Re-
port of the Surgeon General (Executive Summary), 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
1, [9] (1994), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr4304.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL
[161] (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/2000/complete_re
port/pdfs/fullreport.pdf.
93 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Fed. Trade Comm’n Cigarette Rep. for 2007 and 2008
(2011).
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bacco advertisements . . . or to call for voluntary limits on advertising by
manufacturers.”94
The long history of tobacco advertising regulation can enlighten us
on the relationship between advertising and smoking.  Four major regula-
tory events presented opportunities for economists to study how cigarette
advertising affects smoking.  The four major events are the 1953 health
scare, the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report, the 1967–1970 Fairness Doc-
trine, and the 1971 ban of broadcast advertising.95  An article by econo-
mist Jon Nelson divides advertising and consumption patterns into four
time periods based on these major events.96
Nelson defines the first time period as pre-1964, when few restraints
were placed on advertising.97  The 1952–1953 “health scare,” which
made citizens aware of significant health consequences of smoking for
the first time, resulted in a decline in cigarette consumption.98  To ad-
dress the decline, cigarette companies shifted manufacturing to filtered
cigarettes and the government responded with two advertising restric-
tions that went into effect in 1955.99  One regulation prohibited any ref-
erence to the physical effects of smoking, such as reduced throat
irritation, while the other regulation prohibited representations of low
nicotine or low tar cigarettes if unproven by “competent science.”100
The end of this first period was sparked by a 1962 English report on
smoking, which caused the U.S. to begin a more serious investigation of
the health effects of smoking.101
The famous 1964 Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and Health
led to what Nelson considers to be the second time period, which lasted
until 1970.102  Following this release, every cigarette package was re-
quired to contain the following words: “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May
94 See Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 177.  These measures include “bans of broad-
cast and billboard advertising; restrictions on advertising messages and placements; public
reporting requirements for advertising expenditures; requirements for package warning labels;
and attempts to further limit promotions or packaging that might appeal to adolescents and
young adults.” Jon P. Nelson, Cigarette Advertising Regulation: A Meta-analysis, 26 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 195, 196 (2006).  A meta-analysis is an Article that studies empirically many
findings on a single issue.
95 Id. at 196.
96 Id. at 197.
97 See id. at 203.
98 See L. Miller & J. Monahan, The Facts Behind the Cigarette Controversy, READER’S
DIG., July 1954, at 1; see also R. Norr, Cancer by the Carton, READER’S DIG., Dec. 1952, at 7.
99 See Nelson, supra note 94, at 203.
100 See Cigarette Advertising Guides, 16 C.F.R. 15 Part 238 (1955).
101 See C. Scheraga & J. Calfee, The Industry Effects of Information and Regulation in the
Cigarette Market: 1950–1965, 15 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 216, 219 (1996).
102 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: RE-
PORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SER-
VICE (1964), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBMQ.pdf.
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Be Hazardous to Your Health.”103  The 1964 release led to an even larger
decline in cigarette consumption than the 1952 health scare.104  It also
led to the first free broadcasting time for anti-smoking commercials,
which evidence suggests decreased smoking slightly.105
The 1971 cigarette television advertisements ban began the third
time period, which lasted until 1997.  This time period brought more
extensive warning labels (which were adopted in 1971 and again in
1985), warnings in print advertising, the Federal Trade Commission’s
(FTC) tar and nicotine ratings, bans on smoking on airplanes, and the
shift toward non-price promotions.106  This fourth time period started in
1998 and commenced the shift to modern smoking regulations.  This pe-
riod saw the Master Settlement Agreement advertising bans, state and
local clear air laws, competition from generic and deep-discount brands,
and increased emphasis on price promotions.107
Studying these four periods helps us understand how advertising in-
fluences smoking habits and consumer health.108  Figure 2 plots cigarette
consumption per capita and the amount of money tobacco companies
spent on advertising over time.  In Figure 2, a relationship exists between
advertising and smoking: patterns of high advertising spending by to-
bacco companies and patterns of high smoking rates tend to move to-
gether.  On the one hand, notice that per capita consumption peaked in
1963 during the first time period, slowed for about a decade, and has
been decreasing since 1998.109  On the other hand, notice that media ad-
vertising declined in the early 1970s, rose from the mid-1970s to the
mid-1980s, and has been declining sharply since.110
103 See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1966)
(however, in 1966, the ban of representations of nicotine or tar content levels was removed);
see also Press Release, FTC, Factual Statements of Tar and Nicotine Content on Labels and in
Cigarette Advertising (Mar.)
104 See Nelson, supra note 94, at 196.
105 See FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984).
106 See Nelson, supra note 94, at 203.
107 See id.
108 See, e.g., id. at 200.  Using the four major regulatory events, Nelson studied these
effects.
109 See id. at 203–05.  Between 1982 and 2002, cigarette consumption declined annually
at a rate of 3.24% due in part to the sharp increase in real cigarette prices, which rose by 88%
between 1980 and 1992. Id.
110 See id. at 203.  Nominal media advertising declined from 1971 to 1973, rose by 12.7%
per annum between 1973 and 1985, then declined sharply after 1989. Id.  Real media and non-
price promotions rose by 7% per annum between 1985 and 1994 and declined after 1994 as
price promotions rapidly increased. Id.
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FIGURE 2: CIGARETTE CONSUMPTION AND ADVERTISING, 1947–2002111
However, the impact of advertising on smoking has not been iso-
lated because it is difficult to determine whether consumers are respond-
ing to advertising or whether advertisers are responding to
consumption.112  While many studies have been done to answer this
question, the economic opinion on whether advertising increases ciga-
rette use is unsettled.113  History shows that some governmental regula-
tions result in a decrease in smoking, while other regulations do not.  The
economic consensus today is that advertising bans, whether comprehen-
111 See id. at 203.
112 See M. Roberts & L. Samuelson, An Empirical Analysis of Dynamic Nonprice Compe-
tition in an Oligopolistic Industry, 19 RAND J. ECON. 200, 201 (1988) (indicating that ciga-
rette advertising has been found to expand the market to some degree); Don Kenkel et al.,
Private Profits and Public Health: Does Advertising Smoking Cessation Products Encourage
Smokers to Quit?, 115 J. POL. ECON. 447, 448 (2007) (indicating that negative advertising
campaigns have been found to increase consumers’ quitting attempts, but have had less suc-
cess in stopping them from smoking permanently); see also Nelson, supra note 94, at 205
(indicating that overall, cigarette consumption has declined importantly and smoking preva-
lence fell from about 53% of the male population in 1964 to 43% in 1974 and 27% in 1995).
Despite rising real expenditures on promotions, the picture is one of a steadily declining mar-
ket.  Hence, it is unclear if advertising has had any effect on the overall size of the market.
113 See E. Blecher, The Impact of Tobacco Advertising Bans on Consumption in Develop-
ing Countries, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 930, 931 (2008); see also C. Czart et al., The Impact of
Prices and Control Policies on Cigarette Smoking Among College Students, 19 CONTEMP.
ECON. POL’Y 135, 135  (2001) (indicating that other evidence today exists that supports this
notion); E. Lewitt, D. Coate, & M. Grossman, The effects of government regulation on teenage
smoking, 24 J.L. & ECON. 545, 545 (1981); Nelson, supra note 94, at 218 (noting that the 1971
ban of broadcast advertising was the first indication that banning advertisements has no signif-
icant impact on cigarette consumption); Henry Saffer & Frank Chaloupka, The Effect of To-
bacco Advertising Bans on Tobacco Consumption, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 1117, 1119 (2000).
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sive or limited, do not greatly affect cigarette consumption.114  Nonethe-
less, both cigarette companies and the government alike spend large
amounts of money on advertising.115  Meanwhile, governmental regula-
tions for tobacco advertising have been increasing in recent times.116
Yet, from a consumer’s point of view, maybe more information—even if
it is from the tobacco company—is better than less information.  On the
one hand, advertising may simply allow tobacco companies to increase
profits by changing consumer preferences in superficial ways.117 Adver-
tising may also allow tobacco companies to reduce consumer response to
their cigarettes when the price of another cigarette changes.118  On the
other hand, advertising can provide valuable information about “product
attributes, quality, price, and lower[ ] search costs,”119 and may allow
tobacco companies to differentiate their products.120
Hypothetically, tobacco advertising can inform consumers.  In real-
ity, however, most actual advertising is not informative at all.  “The typi-
cal Marlboro ad, with a cowboy smoking a cigarette . . . conveys no
credible information concerning the nature of the product being sold, the
price at which the product is sold, or where the product may be ob-
tained.”121  These advertisements do not help to cure the information
market failure.  Exacerbating the market failure is the tobacco industry’s
long history of deception and unfair trade practices dating back to the
1920s.122  While it is clear that this sort of deception worsens the infor-
mation market failure, most questions regarding the impact of tobacco
advertising on smoking are unfortunately left unanswered.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The economics background section takes the government’s and the
consumer’s view and discusses why and when government intervention
114 See Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 177 (noting that comprehensive bans include
bans on anything related to smoking such as television, radio, print, outdoors, movies, sponsor-
ship and at point of purchase); see, e.g., J. Nelson, Cigarette Demand, Structural Change, and
Advertising Bans: International Evidence, 2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 10
(2003).
115 See Saffer & Chaloupka, supra note 113, at 1118.
116 See Blecher, supra note 113, at 930.
117 See GOSTIN, supra note 29, at 210.
118 See Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 128.  This is known in economics as the cross-
price elasticities of demand.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Imperfect Information in the Product Market, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 769, 842 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig, eds., 1989).
122 In the early 1920s tobacco companies “tactically colluded to keep prices high, and
competed only on the basis of advertising, creating substantial barriers to the entry of potential
new rivals.”  Walter Adams, Price Policies in the Cigarette Industry, 42 AM. ECON. REV. 461,
462 (1952).
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can be justified.  That section, however, ignores the fact that cigarette
manufacturers have rights under the Constitution.  In contrast, this sec-
tion takes the view of cigarette manufacturers while discussing how ciga-
rette manufacturers’ constitutional rights can limit government
intervention into the marketplace.  The next section will take a neutral,
pragmatic perspective while applying and weighing economic reasoning
against cigarette manufacturers’ constitutional rights.
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”123  Freedom of speech includes not
only the right to speak,124 but also the right to refrain from speaking.125
This right to refrain from speaking prevents the government from forcing
association—that is, the government cannot compel individuals to ex-
press a message with which they disagree126 or to subsidize speech with
which they disagree.127  However, because the value of some expression
may not outweigh the benefits of regulating that expression, commercial
speech is afforded less protection than non-commercial speech.128
One reason to protect commercial speech is to allow the truth about
products to be discovered in an open marketplace.129  The idea is that the
market is better at filtering out what is truthful and what is not truthful
than the government would be if it attempted to censor out the falsi-
ties.130  The theory rests in the fact that “[i]n the long run, true ideas do
tend to drive out false ones.”131  For at least this reason, however, the
123 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
124 See Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1072).
125 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
126 See id. at 714–15 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636
(1943)).
127 See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 553 U.S. 405, 410–11 (2001).
128 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 953 (4th
ed. 2011) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY].  However, no clear definition of commercial speech
exists.  In 1975, the first case that protected commercial speech under the First Amendment
held that an expression that proposes a commercial transaction is considered commercial
speech. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821 (1975).  Yet, Bigelow did not limit com-
mercial speech to that or expand on the definition of what is or what is not commercial speech.
Id.  The year 1980 brought some clarity as to the meaning of commercial speech. See Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).  In
Central Hudson, the Court defined commercial speech as an “expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Id.  Then, in 1983, the Court in Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp. held that commercial speech must have the following three char-
acteristics: (1) It is an advertisement of some form, (2) it refers to a specific product, and (3)
the speaker has an economic motivation for the speech.  463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983).  Applying
this test to the graphic image regulations, this Article assumes that because tobacco companies
have an economic interest in advertising on the space (i.e., 50% of the front and back panels)
that the graphic images are to occupy, the graphic image requirements meet the general defini-
tion of commercial speech.
129 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
130 Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1130–31 (1979).
131 See id. at 1122.
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First Amendment does not protect all commercial speech.  The First
Amendment only protects truthful commercial speech; false and decep-
tive commercial speech is afforded no protection.132  The reason for this
distinction follows directly from the First Amendment’s purpose—false
and deceptive ads distort the marketplace of ideas.133  In fact, it is for
that reason that the First Amendment affords no protection for advertis-
ing that even risks deceiving consumers, even where the advertisement’s
substantive message is truthful.134
When commercial speech is regulated, the framework for determin-
ing the constitutionality of that regulation requires answering a threshold
question of what type of disclosure is at issue.135  Depending on the type
disclosure, three possible legal standards can apply.  If the regulation re-
quires the disclosure of uncontroverted factual information about a prod-
uct, the lenient Zauderer standard can apply to the government’s interest
in preventing deception.136  If the regulation requires the disclosure of
controverted factual information about a product, the Central Hudson
intermediate scrutiny standard applies to the governmental interests de-
fined in the regulation.137  If the regulation compels the speaker to adopt
an ideology or a viewpoint, the Wooley strict scrutiny standard can apply
to the governmental interests defined in the regulation.138  For the
graphic image requirements, care should be given in categorizing the
type of disclosure at issue in the regulation and what governmental inter-
ests are at stake.
The lenient Zauderer standard applies to the government’s interest
in preventing consumer deception.139  For Zauderer to apply, a court
132 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
133 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 128, at 1132.  But the problem with false and deceptive
advertising is that the Court has never decided a case on those merits.  But we do know that
although false advertising is considered separately from truthful advertising, many times they
come hand in hand.
134 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 2 (1979).
135 See Royal, supra note 24, at 236.
136 See id.
137 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570.
138 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 705–06 (1977).
139 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Superior Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 629 (1985).  The Court in Zauderer held that the deception can occur by omission.  In
that case, an attorney’s advertisements were held to be deceptive by omission when advertising
that the lawyer would work on a contingency fee.  The advertisements stated that clients would
not be required to pay fees if they won their case, but omitted that the clients would still be
responsible for their litigation costs.  As such, laws requiring a disclosure of information in
advertising can be constitutional. See Milavetz, Gallop, & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130
S. Ct. 1324, 1329 (2010) (upholding a federal law requiring debt relief agencies to disclose
that they are “debt relief agencies” in their advertising).  The reasoning is that disclosure is
sometimes needed to combat inherently misleading commercial advertising or to preserve the
“fair bargaining process.” See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
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must find that graphic images are “purely factual and uncontroversial
information” which is “reasonably related” to the state’s interest in
preventing consumer deception regarding how the health consequences
of smoking apply to consumers.140  Deception under Zauderer has its
own meaning under First Amendment doctrine. Zauderer deception is
not deception in the normal sense because if “the speech is actually mis-
leading, it enjoys no First Amendment protection.”141  For the Zauderer
standard to apply, commercial speech must only present the “possibility
of deception” or a “tendency to mislead.”142  A court may rely on experi-
ence and common sense instead of “evidence that [the] advertisements
are misleading” if it finds that “the likelihood of deception” is “hardly a
speculative one.”143
The Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard could be used to
address the government’s interests in reducing smoking and informing
consumers.144  The Supreme Court articulated a four-part test in Central
Hudson.145  First, commercial speech must concern a lawful activity and
not be false, deceptive, or misleading.  Second, the government interest
asserted must be substantial.  Third, the regulation of commercial speech
must directly advance the governmental interest asserted.  Fourth, the
regulation must be no more extensive than necessary to serve the govern-
mental interest.146  A challenged government regulation is constitutional
under Central Hudson only if it meets this four-part test.
The Wooley strict scrutiny standard could also be used to address
the government’s interests in reducing smoking and informing consum-
ers.147  For Wooley to apply, a court must first find that the disclosure
does not convey factual information to consumers, but that it conveys an
ideological message.148  With respect to graphic image requirements, the
message would likely suggest that smoking is disgusting.  Alternatively,
140 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
141 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002).
142 Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340.
143 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 616 F.3d 1205, 1227 (Rogers, J., dissenting)
(quoting Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340).
144 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
145 See id.  As a procedural note, the government has the burden of proving that the re-
striction of commercial speech meets the Central Hudson test. See Endenfield v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761, 770–71(1993).
146 In three cases following the Central Hudson opinion, the Court seemed to alter the test
before changing it back to the original version. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v.
United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195–96 (1999) (declaring bans on gambling advertisements un-
constitutional); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 425, 570–71 (2001) (declaring
placement of tobacco advertisements unconstitutional); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535
U.S. 357, 376–77 (2002) (declaring certain bans on certain drugs advertisements
unconstitutional).
147 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
148 See Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 554–55.
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the message might be that the risks associated with smoking outweigh
the pleasure derived from smoking.  If a court finds the messages to be
ideological in nature, a court must then find that either the government’s
interests in reducing smoking or the government’s interest to inform con-
sumers demonstrates a compelling government interest.149  If the court
concludes that one or both of the interests are compelling, it must then
find that graphic warning labels provide a narrowly tailored means of
achieving one or both of those interests and that less restrictive, alterna-
tive means of providing consumers with information cannot serve the
government’s purpose.150  The graphic images can only overcome the
heavy burden of strict scrutiny if they meet each part of the Wooley
test.151
III. ANALYSIS
Compelled commercial speech is a doctrinal mess.  Courts must
first decide whether the Zauderer, Central Hudson, or Wooley standard
applies.  Then, courts must actually apply the standards to the facts.
Complicating the compelled commercial speech doctrine for the graphic
image requirements are various theoretical and empirical economic argu-
ments both for and against the requirements.
This analysis aims to inform non-economists about how the various
economic arguments should apply to First Amendment law.  This is nec-
essary because the adversarial process of the law caused both the FDA
and tobacco companies to use aspects of the relevant economics litera-
ture to construct arguments most favorable to them.  This analysis at-
tempts to reconcile the economic and legal theories brought to bear in
these arguments, and proceeds as follows.  The first section uses a game
theory approach to analyze each separate governmental interest under
applicable legal tests, and presents what the ultimate outcomes should be
in all of the legal tests.  That section then uses Bayesian inference to
make assumptions about how the Supreme Court would rule employing
the various legal tests.152  Solving the model by forward induction yields
the prediction that the constitutionality of the graphic image require-
149 See Thompson, 535 U.S. at 357.
150 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17.
151 See id.
152 Here, Bayesian inference uses updating techniques to make assumptions about what
the Court must rationally hold to reach a certain point in the analysis. See ROBERT GIBBONS,
GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 143 (1992); see also DOUGLAS BAIRD, ROBERT
GERTNER & RANDAL PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 159 (1994).  For example, for the
Court to reach Central Hudson’s “directly advance” analysis, it must have considered the
graphic images ideological neutral.  Therefore, in determining how the Court will partake in
this analysis, we would take those facts as given.
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ments will depend on whether the images are ideologically neutral.153
The second section proposes a new, more concrete, and more tractable
test for what should be the critical question before the Court: Whether
graphic image requirements are a form of information or a form of com-
pelled speech.
A. A Game-Theoretic Model of the Compelled Commercial Speech
Doctrine
To determine whether the graphic image requirements are constitu-
tional, care must be given in pointing out exactly which interests could
potentially apply to the different legal standards.  Table 1 charts the three
government interests along with the authority and legal standards that
could control.  For example, the Zauderer standard may apply to address
the government’s interest in preventing deception, an interest created
under constitutional law related to the government’s interest in informing
consumers.  The Wooley and Central Hudson standards could potentially
apply to address the government’s interest in reducing smoking, its inter-
est in informing consumers, or both.  Whether the Wooley strict scrutiny
standard applies, rather than the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny
standard, depends on whether the graphic images are ideological rather
than informational in nature.  However, even if the images convey an
ideological message, that finding will not necessarily outweigh the
images’ informing function to the point where they become unconstitu-
tional under Wooley.154
153 Forward induction is a technique that looks at past behavior to determine what will
happen at a later stage in the game.  This is a solution technique that uses Bayesian inference
to determine how we could reach a certain point in the game. See GIBBONS, supra note 152, at
239.
154 The Reynolds dissent was right in saying: “Regardless of which level of scrutiny ap-
plies, the court errs in failing to examine both of the government’s stated interests.  In the
rulemaking, the FDA articulated complementary, but distinct, interests in effectively convey-
ing information about the negative health consequences of smoking to consumers and in de-
creasing smoking rates.”  R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 616 F.3d 1205, 1223 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,633).  The dissent was
correct to point out that the majority missed the government’s second interest of effectively
conveying information when it dismissed the government’s interest in informing consumers as
being “too vague” and was right to find that this interest “merits independent consideration.”
Id.
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TABLE 1: COMPLETE CONTINGENT PLAN FOR THE COURT
Government Interest
Interest Authority Required Standard of Proof
Prevent Zauderer Established Reasonably RelatedDeception
Provide Wooley Compelling Narrowly Tailored
CentralInformation Substantial Directly AdvancesHudson
Reduce Wooley Compelling Narrowly Tailored
CentralSmoking Substantial Directly AdvancesHudson
Courts have disagreed on which legal test is controlling.  The D.C.
District Court in Reynolds applied Wooley.155  On appeal, the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Reynolds applied Central Hudson.156  Moreover, both the District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky157 and the Sixth Circuit158
applied Zauderer in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery.  The dissenting
opinion for the Sixth Circuit said Central Hudson should apply.159
When applying the different legal standards, courts have used and mis-
used related arguments to reach their conclusions.160  This Article will
155 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 45 (D.D.C 2011).
156 See Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217.
157 See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. United States, No. 09-cv-00117
(W.D.K.C. 2011).
158 See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 534 (6th
Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., dissenting).
159 See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, 674 F.3d at 534 (Clay, J., dissenting).
160 Some arguments for applying different standards should overlap.  First, the question of
whether the images convey information (under Central Hudson) or are compelling ideology
(under Wooley) is a similar inquiry to the question of whether the images are purely factual
and uncontroversial under Zauderer.  If the images are considered ideological in nature and
therefore Wooley applies, it would suggest that the graphic images are not purely factual and
uncontroversial under Zauderer.  Next, the question of whether the graphic images inform
consumers under Central Hudson and Wooley is a similar inquiry to the question of whether
the graphic images are needed to prevent consumer deception under Zauderer.  If the graphic
images are in fact needed to prevent consumer deception under Zauderer, this suggests that
consumers are not fully informed and therefore the images would indeed inform consumers
under Central Hudson and Wooley.
Other arguments in applying certain standards must not overlap.  It is important to distin-
guish the question of whether the graphic images inform consumers and the question of
whether the graphic images reduce smoking.  All the statistics about the number of deaths per
year caused by smoking are relevant to the government’s interest in reducing smoking, but are
not directly relevant to the government’s interest in informing consumers.  As discussed in the
background section, the main governmental interest in informing consumers deals with the
addictive nature of nicotine and how smoking risks apply to them personally.  While this may
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set up a game-theoretic model that will help avoid misusing irrelevant
arguments.
Before setting up the extensive form game tree model, we, like a
court, shall begin our inquiry by briefly pointing out and noting as insuf-
ficient to carry the standards the government’s interest in reducing smok-
ing under both Central Hudson and Wooley.  With over thirty countries
having adopted graphic images on cigarette packs similar to those ana-
lyzed here, economists have been able to study the effect of the images
on smoking rates.161  The general empirical findings suggest that graphic
images on cigarette packages do not significantly reduce smoking.162  In
fact, there is suggestion that the FDA concedes this point.163  The simple
fact that a consensus exists should end the Court’s inquiry on whether the
government’s interest in reducing smoking can justify the graphic
images.  Thus, we have quickly narrowed our constitutional inquiry to
the government’s interest in providing information, which could poten-
tially be justified under Zauderer, Central Hudson, or Wooley.
The three-stage extensive form game tree modeling how courts
should decide the constitutionality of the graphic images is provided in
Figure 3.164  As represented in the game tree, the Court should first de-
in fact lead to reductions in smoking prevalence, providing information is an interest on its
own, regardless of whether it reduces smoking.
161 See Australia Is First Country to Require Plain, Logo-Free Cigarette Packaging,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 15, 2012), http://adage.com/article/global-news/australia-rules-plain-
logo-free-cigarette-packaging/236696/.
162 See, e.g., R. Borland et al., Impact of Graphic and Text Warnings on Cigarette Packs:
Findings from Four Countries over Five Years, 18 TOBACCO CONTROL 358 (2009), available
at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/18/5/358.full.pdftˇml; see also Damon Clark &
Heather Royer, The Effect of Education on Adult Health and Mortality: Evidence from Britain,
(NBER Working Paper No. 16013, 2010); Franque Grimard & Daniel Parent, Education and
Smoking: Were Vietnam War Draft Avoiders Also More Likely to Avoid Smoking?, 27 J.
HEALTH ECON. 896 (2007); but see James Thrasher et al., Smokers’ Reactions to Cigarette
Package Warnings with Graphic Imagery and with Only Text: A Comparison between Mexico
and Canada, 49 SALUD P ´UBLICA M´EXICO 233 (2007), available at http://bvs.insp.mx/rsp/
_files/File/2007/supl%202/10-smokers.pdf.  Some studies have not been able to establish or
rule out a causal relationship. See, e.g., Steffen Reinhold & Hendrik Jurges, Secondary School
Fees and the Causal Effect of Schooling on Health Behavior, 19 HEALTH ECON. 994 (2009).
Other studies have found that they may affect men but not women. See, e.g., D. Kenkel,
Health Behaviours Among Young People, in 6 THE ELGAR COMPANION TO HEALTH ECONOM-
ICS 60 (2006).  However, other research indicates that both warning labels on cigarette packs
and paid antismoking advertisements have significantly cut tobacco use in the past. See
Chaloupka & Warner, supra note 45, at 1594–95.
163 As the D.C. Court of Appeals in Reynolds points out: “[O]ne of the principal research-
ers on whom FDA relies recently surveyed the relevant literature and conceded that ‘[t]here is
no way to attribute . . . declines [in smoking] to the new health warnings.’” Reynolds, 696
F.3d at 1220 (citing David Hammond, Health Warnings Messages on Tobacco Products: A
Review, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 327, 331 (2011), available at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/
content/20/5/327.full.pdf).
164 Although courts will not set up the game tree in Figure 3, it will rule as if it did set up
the game tree.  Likewise, although courts will not say the constitutionality of the images de-
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cide whether the images are “purely factual and uncontroversial informa-
tion.”165  If the Court answers this question in the affirmative, it should
apply Zauderer.166  If not, it should advance to Stage 2, where it will ask
whether the images are information or compelled ideology.  Depending
on what it finds in Stage 2, the Court will then proceed either to the
Central Hudson or Wooley analysis.
Stage 1:
Are the images “purely factual and uncontroversial information”?
Stage 2:
Ideology v. information
Stage 3(ii)(a):
Substantial interest?
Stage 3(i)(a):
Compelling interest?
Stage 3(ii)(b):
Directly advance to a material degree?
Stage 3(i)(b):
Narrowly tailored?
Stage 3(ii)(c):
No more extensive than necessary?
Stage 3(i)(c):
Less restrictive means available?
Yes
No
Yes Yes
No No
Yes YesNo No
unconstitutional
unconstitutional
unconstitutional
constitutional constitutional
Apply Zauderer
Ideology:
Apply Wooley
Information:
Apply Central Hudson
FIGURE 3: EXTENSIVE FORM GAME TREE
pends on the solution to the game, they will rule as if the constitutionality depends on the
solution.
165 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Superior Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
166 This Article does not provide a sub-game for the Zauderer analysis because, as this
section will discuss, that analysis should not be rationally reached.
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We will solve the game using forward induction.167  To simplify the
game, however, we shall start at Stage 1 and briefly point out why
Zauderer is not controlling.  For Zauderer to apply, the graphic images
must be considered purely factual and uncontroversial information.168
The graphic images were designed to evoke emotion for the purpose of
helping consumers retain the health information presented.169  Evoking
emotion by its very nature does not seem to be the type of uncontrover-
sial information required under Zauderer.170  This Article agrees with the
D.C. Circuit majority in Reynolds, where it convincingly explained how
the “FDA’s images are a much different animal” than the textual state-
ments requiring advertisements to disclose how a fee is calculated in
Zauderer.171  Unlike purely textual and informative disclosure, the
graphic images rely on behavioral economic theory, which suggests that
the images evoke consumers’ emotions to help them to better process,
comprehend, and retain information.172  Even the FDA concedes that the
images “are not meant to be interpreted literally, but rather to symbolize
the textual warning statements, which provide ‘additional context for
what is shown.’”173  Thus, the graphic images are not the sort of “purely
factual and uncontroversial” information that Zauderer allows.174  Ac-
cordingly, the Court will reach Stage 2 of the game tree.  We will solve
the game by determining the outcome in each situation using forward
induction.  First, we will pretend we have reached Stage 3(i)(a) and as-
sume that the images send an ideological message when we solve that
sub-game.  Next, we will pretend we are at Stage 3(ii)(a) and assume that
the images are ideologically neutral when we solve that sub-game.
167 Solving an extensive form game like this one using forward induction is done by using
information that must have been determined in prior stages for the game to progress into the
current stage. See GIBBONS, supra note 152, at 239.
168 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Superior Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985).
169 See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,642.
170 The disclosures in Zauderer required “any advertisement that mentions contingent-fee
rates [to] ‘disclos[e] whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of court costs
and expenses.” Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 633.  Further, the disclosures in Milavetz required ad-
vertisements to describe what type of agency the party was and how they helped clients by
requiring them to include the following statement: “We are debt relief agency.  We help people
file for under the Bankruptcy Code.”  Milavetz Gallop, & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130
S. Ct. 1324, 1330 (2010).
171 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
172 This issue is the topic of Part III.B infra.
173 Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1224 (citing Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,655).
174 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.  Even if the images are held to be purely factual and
uncontroversial information, the images are not needed to prevent consumer deception.  To-
bacco companies’ advertising is currently restrained to a great degree, including regulations
that restrict companies from advertising that cigarettes are “light” or low in tar and nicotine.  It
seems that, on its face, cigarette advertising is so lacking of any information at all that it could
not possibly be inherently misleading.  Disclosure of information does not seem to be needed
to combat current cigarette advertising because there is really nothing to combat.
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First, assume we reach Stage 3(i)(a), i.e., that the Court finds the
images to be ideological in nature so that Wooley applies.  Then, because
Stage 3(i)(a), i.e., determining whether an interest is compelling, is usu-
ally a perfunctory step under Wooley, we jump to Stage 3(i)(b) and ask
whether informing consumers of smoking risks by using graphic images
is narrowly tailored.175  For the sake of argument, assume we make it
past Stage 3(i)(b).  Then, in Stage 3(i)(c), forward induction tells us that
graphic images are more like forced association than a form of informa-
tion, so images do not function solely to inform consumers.  Said differ-
ently, for Wooley to apply in the first place, the Court must find that
graphic images are more like forced association than a form of informa-
tion and, thus, do not function solely to inform consumers.  As other
means of informing consumers are less restrictive by their very nature
(i.e., they do not regulate tobacco company speech), the Court would
probably not find that less restrictive alternative means cannot serve to
inform the consumers as required under Wooley.176  Therefore, if Stage
3(i)(a) is reached, the images will be held unconstitutional.  That is, if the
images are not found to be ideologically neutral, they will be unconstitu-
tional under Wooley.
Next, assume we reach Stage 3(ii)(a) and that the Court finds the
images to be ideologically neutral so that Central Hudson applies.  Stage
3(ii)(a) requires that providing health information about the conse-
quences of smoking and the addictiveness of nicotine to consumers to be
a “substantial” governmental interest.177  Establishing this requirement
should be simple.  Smokers lack the information needed to accurately
assess the risks and costs of smoking and therefore cannot make in-
formed choices about smoking—a well-defined market failure.178  Thus,
the government can be justified in intervening in the tobacco market to
guarantee that consumers are adequately informed.179  Accordingly, the
Court should find that providing health information about the conse-
quences of smoking and the addictiveness of nicotine to consumers is a
“substantial” governmental interest under Central Hudson.
The next question in Stage 3(ii)(b) is whether the FDA has offered
substantial evidence showing that the graphic warning requirements “di-
rectly advance the governmental interest” in informing consumers of the
175 See Stephanie Jordan Bennett, Comment, Paternalistic Manipulation through Picto-
rial Warnings: The First Amendment, Commercial Speech, and the Family Smoking Preven-
tion and Tobacco Act, 81 MISS. L. J. 1909, 1911 (2012) (citing R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
FDA, No. 11-1482, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128372, at *27 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 7, 2011)).
176 See GOSTIN, supra note 29, at 361.
177 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
557 (1980).
178 See MWG, supra note 12, at 368.
179 See id.
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risks of smoking and the addictive nature of nicotine.180  Forward induc-
tion tells us that the graphic images are a form of information and not of
forced association.181  Said differently, for courts to apply Central Hud-
son, it must have found that graphic images are a form of information
and not of forced association.182  Evidence suggests that the graphic
images will be viewed 7,000 times a year by every pack-a-day
smoker.183  Evidence also suggests that graphic images will lead to more
informed consumers in the United States.184  That graphic images (which
the Court considers a form of information) will be viewed 7,000 times a
year by pack-a-day smokers and in addition will lead to more informed
consumers means that the graphic images should “directly advance” the
government’s interest in informing consumers.
The next question in Stage 3(ii)(b) is whether the graphic images
inform consumers to a “material degree.”185  Stage 3(ii)(c) requires the
images to be no more extensive than necessary.  We will address these
stages together.  The government bears the heavy burden of justifying the
means for the end, which cannot be merely “speculation or conjec-
ture.”186  The extent to which graphic images lead to more informed con-
sumers depends on how many consumers are at least partially
uninformed.  The more uninformed consumers there are, the more the
graphic images will be found to inform to a material degree.  Although
the government has made considerable attempts to inform consumers in
the past, evidence suggests that many consumers are not fully informed
of the risks of smoking and the addictive nature of nicotine.187  For ex-
180 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993)).
181 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 720 (1977).
182 See id.
183 Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoPro
ducts/Labeling/ucm259214.htm.
184 See Effectiveness of Cigarette Warning Labels in Informing Smokers About the Risks
of Smoking: Findings From the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Four Country Survey, 15
TOBACCO CONTROL 19 (2006).
185 See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 626 (1995).
186 See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993); see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995).
187 The Court should look to what we know about informing consumers.  Over the past
fifty years, we have learned much about what works and what does not work in regards to
informing consumers about smoking.  First, new ways of displaying information have informa-
tional impacts.  Information gets old over time and has diminishing impact as time elapses, but
some evidence suggests that graphic images may sustain their informative effects longer than
text-only warning labels. See J. Li & M. Grigg, New Zealand: New Graphic Warnings En-
courage Registrations with the Quitline, 18 TOBACCO CONTROL 72 (2009).  Besides television,
smokers obtain most of their health information about smoking from warning labels. See D.
HAMMOND, TOBACCO LABELLING & PACKAGING TOOLKIT:  A GUIDE TO FCTC ARTICLE 11, 17
(2009), available at http://www.tobaccolabels.ca/tobaccolab/iuatldtook.  Even non-smokers
and children pay attention to the warning labels. See id, at 19.  Second, “[c]onsumers some-
times respond strongly to the provision of new information. A dramatic example is the release
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ample, current smokers consuming cigarettes in cartons without graphic
warnings are overly optimistic about how long they will survive (com-
pared to scientific predictions given their smoking behavior).188  The in-
formation consumers lack is not homogenous, however, and some
consumers are more informed than others.189  Some consumers are not
fully informed of their health risks,190 while others are unaware of how
the health risks apply to them.191  There are also smokers who do not
always have consistent outlooks on the harms of smoking.192  For these
reasons, the FDA claims it designed the nine graphic images to present
different information.193
of the first Surgeon General’s report on smoking and health in 1964, which was followed by
an immediate 5 percent decrease in smoking.” See Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 175.
Highly educated individuals respond more to new types of information than less educated
individuals. See, e.g., M. Grossman, The Human Capital Model, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH
ECONOMICS 347 (A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse eds. Elsevier, 2000).  This suggests that the
government should identify the trends among unknowledgeable smokers and design policies
specifically addressing how these groups could be informed.  For example, if the only way the
government can inform low income consumers is through graphic images, it may be justified
in using the images on the sole grounds of informing those low income consumers.  After all,
we know that some consumers are more sensitive to information regarding health conse-
quences than others. See Cawley & Ruhm supra note 1, at 137.
188 See Smith et al., supra note 78, at 676; A. Khwaja, F. Sloan, & S. Chung, The Rela-
tionship between Individual Expectations and Behaviors: Mortality Expectations and Smoking
Decisions, 35 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 192, 197 (2007).
189 For example, low-income individuals are less informed than higher income individu-
als and some individuals are less informed because of language barriers. See Hyon B. Shin &
Rosalind Bruno, Language Use and English-Speaking Ability: 2000, CENSUS.GOV 9 (Oct.
2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf.
190 For example, “smokers aged 50 to 65, unlike their nonsmoking counterparts, underes-
timate their personal probability of dying within the next 10 years.” See Khwaja et al., supra
note 189, at 197.  The Final Rule provides insightful evidence that
smokers may not be fully informed of the risks associated with cigarette smoking . . .
that those who have an accurate understanding of the statistical risks may underesti-
mate their personal risks; and even where consumers have an accurate understand-
ing, the risk might not be considered at the time of purchase.
Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,709 (citing Smith et al., supra note 79, at 676).  “[Y]oung
American consumers are aware of some health consequences of smoking, such as the in-
creased probability of lung cancer, but not of others, such as the increased probability of
stroke.” Id.; see M. O’Hegarty et al., Young Adults’ Perceptions of Cigarette Warning Labels
in the United States and Canada, 4 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE 1 (2007).
191 See Smith et al., supra note 79, at 676, 684, 686 (Noting that many smokers will not
personalize the risks “unless there is clear evidence that [smoking] is negatively affecting their
own health.”).
192 For example, “adults [are] much more likely to overestimate than to underestimate the
extent to which smoking raises the risk of lung cancer.”  Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 138
(citing W. Viscusi, Do Smokers Underestimate Risks?, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1253, 1268 (1990)).
Older smokers who are considered “heavy smokers” have a subjective expectation to live
twice as long as their true life expectancy. See M. Schoenbaum, Do Smokers Understand the
Mortality Effects of Smoking?  Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey, 87 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 755, 757 (1997).
193 See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,629.
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Research shows us that smoking “tends to be habitual, repetitious,
and almost unconscious.”194  Thus, one justification for why the graphic
images are needed to help inform consumers—which likely influenced
Congress’s decision to pass the bill—is that they make the unconscious
become conscious.  By evoking emotion, the FDA explains, graphic
images will help consumers to better process, comprehend, and retain the
information.195  That is, if the traditional warnings cannot be understood
by, for example, lower educated people,196 then the images may be
needed as a salience measure to provide them with information.197  In
194 B. Means et al., Cognitive Research on Response Error in Survey Questions on Smok-
ing, 6 VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 5, 8 (1992).
195 See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,642 (referencing studies, which showed significant
effects on salience measures for all of the nine required warnings, as well as the international
experience demonstrating the enhanced communication value of larger, graphic warnings).
The Final Rule also references studies suggesting the improved effectiveness of Canada’s
larger, graphic warnings at communicating health risks.  For example, national surveys con-
ducted on behalf of Health Canada indicate that approximately 95% of youth smokers and
75% of adult smokers report that the Canadian pictorial warnings have been effective in pro-
viding them with important health information. See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,699.
196 It is estimated that each additional year of education is associated with a three percent
lower probability of smoking. See D. Cutler & A. Lleras-Muney, Understanding Differences
in Health Behaviors by Education, 29 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 4 (2010).  College graduates were
13.9% less likely to smoke than high school dropouts.  Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 106
(correlating education with healthier behaviors); A. Lleras-Muney & F. Lichtenberg, Are the
More Educated More Likely to Use New Drugs?, 79 ANNALES D’ECONOMIE ET STATISTIQUE
671, 693 (2005) (demonstrating that people with higher education are more likely to adopt
medical technologies).  Even more concerning is the widening gap between the number of
poor and uneducated that smoke and the number of non-poor educated that smoke. See S.
Kanjilal et al., Socioeconomic Status and Trends in Disparities in 4 Major Risk Factors for
Cardiovascular Disease Among US Adults, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2348, 2348 (2006)
(relying on data analysis to show that education and income related disparities have worsened
for smoking).  This larger gap has only “emerged over the past four decades because of larger
reductions in smoking for more advantaged adults.”  Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 107
(explaining “the gap in current smoking between persons with more versus less than a high
school education was 11.6 percentage points (33.5 vs. 45.1 percent) in 1971-1974 but had
almost doubled to 21.5 points (17.1 vs. 38.6 percent) in 1999-2002; during the same period the
smoking differential between the highest and lowest poverty-income-ratio (PIR) quartiles rose
from 10.5 (33.5 vs. 44.0 percent) to 23.5 (13.9 vs. 37.4 percent) percentage points.”).  Further-
more, Cawley’s study found the gap in “smoking rates between those with and without a
college degree grew from 2 percentage points in 1954 to 15 points in 1999.”  Cawley & Ruhm,
supra note 1, at 107 (concluding that “highly educated tobacco users are much more likely
than their less educated counterparts to quit smoking”).  Whether this is because of the infor-
mational difference between the highly educated and the less educated is unclear, but we have
not been able to rule it out.  One argument that supports that information is the issue deals with
access to health care.  Although physicians counseling smokers of the extent of health risks
reduces smoking rates, many smokers do not receive this advice from their doctors, especially
ethnic minority groups. See L. Stead, G. Bergson, & T. Lancaster, Physician Advice for Smok-
ing Cessation, 2 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REV. 165 (2008).
197 See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR
THE NATION 295 (2007), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11795.html (noting that text-
based warnings likely require a college reading level and may be inappropriate for youth and
Americans with poor reading abilities).
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other words, these consumers will internalize the addictiveness of nico-
tine better by viewing the picture of the man with smoke flowing out of
his trachea than by reading an essay about how nicotine can be addictive.
The images thereby serve as a complement to the textual statements.
They provide necessary reinforcement to each of the nine messages that
the FDA is attempting to communicate.  Without the images, less edu-
cated and younger consumers may be unable to discern the health risks
of smoking because textual warning labels and government antismoking
advertisements do not fully inform them of the associated risks.198
Whether graphic images inform consumers of the negative health
consequences of smoking to a material degree is not totally clear.  What
is also not clear is the extent that the tobacco industry’s history of decep-
tion will play a role in this inquiry.  On one hand, preventing deception is
not the determining factor under Central Hudson.  On the other hand,
past deception can in fact lead consumers to be uninformed and can
therefore play an indirect role.  Overall, evidence suggests that graphic
images are more effective for educating smokers about the health risks of
smoking than text-only warnings,199 increasing smokers’ thoughts about
the health risks more than text-only warnings,200 and informing the pub-
lic about health risks in general.201  However, many smokers will not
personalize the risks unless there is clear evidence that smoking is nega-
198 Smoking trends support this argument.  See M. Grossman & R. Kaestner, Effects of
Education on Health, in THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF EDUCATION, 69, 75 (Jere R. Behrman &
Nevzer Stacey, eds., 1997) (noting that the more educated will likely have a more rapid re-
sponse when learning about the harmful effects of smoking).  Other factors, such as better
occupation or higher income, also correlate with lower rates of smoking. See, e.g., Cawley &
Ruhm, supra note 1, at 107.  However, at least three studies point directly to higher education
correlating with a reduction of the probability of smoking.  See id.; see also J. Currie & E.
Moretti, Mother Education and the Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital: Evi-
dence from College Openings and Longitudinal Data, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1495, 1495 (2003)
(finding that education reduces the probability of smoking); Damien de Walque, Education,
Information, and Smoking Decisions; Evidence from Smoking Histories, 1940–2000, 45 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 682, 682 (2004), available at http://aeaweb.org/assa/2006/0108_1300_0601
.pdf (observing that there is strong correlation between education and health even after control-
ling for income).
199 Some evidence suggests that graphic images lead to fewer disparities in health knowl-
edge across educational levels. See Hammond, supra note 187, at 19.  Other evidence sug-
gests that graphic images are more likely to be noticed than text-only warning labels. See D.
Hammond et al., Text and Graphic Warnings on Cigarette Packages: Findings from the ITC
Four Country Survey, 32 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 202, 202 (2007).
200 See J. Thrasher et al., Smokers’ Reactions to Cigarette Package Warnings with
Graphic Imagery and with Only Text: a Comparison Between Mexico and Canada. 49 SALUD
P ´UBLICA DE M´EXICO 233, 233 (2007).  “Australia’s requirement of larger warning labels in-
creased tobacco consumers’ knowledge that smoking causes cancer, heart and circulatory ill-
nesses, and pregnancy-related problems.”  Final Rule supra note 3, at 36,709 (citing M.
O’Hegarty et al., Young Adults’ Perceptions of Cigarette Warning Labels in the United States
and Canada, in 4 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE 1 (2007)).
201 See Hammond et al., supra note 199, at 202.
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tively affecting their own health, which if true implies that “graphic
images will only have a limited effect on behavior until individuals incur
a health shock related to the unhealthy behavior.”202  The key issue here
is the fact that the Court has given greater deference to commercial
speech regulation designed to protect minors rather than adults.203  The
Court has said that “minors are not yet fully able to assess and analyze
independently the value of the message presented.”204  That minors will
be more informed of the risks of smoking and the addictiveness of nico-
tine appears to be beyond “speculation or conjecture”205 to the point
graphic images directly advance the government’s interest in informing
consumers to a material degree.  Therefore, if Stage 3(ii)(b) is reached,
the images should be held constitutional.  In other words, the Court
should find the graphic images to be constitutional under Central Hudson
if it finds the graphic images to be ideologically neutral.
Using a game theory model, this section has exhausted all of the
possible legal routes the Court could take.  Some of the arguments in this
section have used forward induction to determine how the Court would
likely rule upon reaching certain points in its analysis.  To summarize,
the Court should have four findings.  First, the Court should find that
graphic images do not reduce smoking, and therefore should not partake
in a lengthy constitutional analysis on this governmental interest.  Sec-
ond, the Court should not find Zauderer to control because the graphic
image requirements were designed to evoke emotion, and are therefore
not “purely factual and uncontroversial” information.206  This means that
the answer to Stage 1 is No.  Finally, depending on which standard it
finds controlling, the Court should find that the graphic image require-
ments are either unconstitutional under Wooley or constitutional under
Central Hudson based on the government’s interest in providing infor-
mation.  Therefore, the constitutionality of the graphic images should
boil down to the outcome in Stage 2, i.e., whether Central Hudson or
202 See Cawley & Ruhm, supra note 1, at 139.
203 See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
744–45 (1996) (upholding cable television restrictions as a means of protecting children from
indecent programming); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739 (1979) (upholding the
FCC finding that indecent speech “in an afternoon broadcast when children are in the audience
was patently offensive”); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (rejecting the
assertion that “the scope of the constitutional freedom of expression . . . cannot be made to
depend on whether the citizen is an adult or a minor”).
204 Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 329 (1996).  This is because “by the
time they are capable of making a mature judgment, their health may be harmed irrevocably
and their decisional capacity impaired by the product’s addictive qualities.” GOSTIN, supra
note 29, at 357.
205 See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993); see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995).
206 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Superior Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 633 (1985).
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Wooley is controlling.  As this is the only remaining legal question, it is
where we now turn.
B. Central Hudson versus Wooley
We are in Stage 2.  The question we seek to answer here is simple.
Under the First Amendment, are graphic images a form of information
provided to consumers like the printed textual warning labels currently
on cigarette packages and a warning sign with a picture of a stick figure
man falling that say “CAUTION: WET FLOOR”?  Or are they a form of
speech like requiring children to salute a flag207 or like requiring all auto-
mobiles to display license plates that say “Live Free or Die”?208
In the commercial speech context, graphic images are a form of
speech if they compel opinions or value judgments.209  It is important to
point out what types of information and speech the graphic images could
be presenting.  On the one hand, the graphic images could be communi-
cating the health consequences of smoking and the addictive nature of
nicotine.  There are nine specific risks the FDA is attempting to commu-
nicate, one for each of the nine labels.210  On the other hand, the graphic
images could be communicating the opinion that smoking is disgusting
or the value judgment that no one should ever smoke because the harms
of smoking outweigh the benefits.  The fact that the some people in soci-
ety hold the opinion that smoking is disgusting or the judgment that no
one should smoke does not transform it from compelling ideology to
factual information.211  Distinguishing between the speech as an opinion
207 See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943)
(holding that saluting the flag is a form of speech).
208 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
209 See Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law & the Scientific
Method, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 279 (1989)); Royal, supra note 24, at 240 (“A value
judgment is a statement that something is good or bad, that one believes in something, or that
one should do something. . . .”  Of course a message need not take the form of a command to
constitute ideology.  The message that mushrooms are worth consuming irrespective the brand
implicitly suggests mushrooms should be consumed, and this renders it ideological.  It is an
“ought” not an “is.”) ((citing J.P. Smit, The Supposed “Inseparability” of Fact and Value, 22
S. AFR. J. PHIL. 51, 51–60 (2003) (“A ‘value judgment’ is . . . a judgment regarding the
irreducible ‘goodness,’ ‘badness,’ etc., of something, or the equivalent judgment that some-
thing ‘should’ or ‘should not’ be done.”).
210 Again, the nine textual statements were as follows: (1) Cigarettes are addictive; (2)
tobacco smoke can harm your child; (3) cigarettes cause fatal lung disease; (4) cigarettes cause
cancer; (5) cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease; (6) smoking during pregnancy can harm
your baby; (7) smoking can kill you; (8) tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in non-
smokers; (9) quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health. See Final
Rule, supra note 3, at 36,628.
211 See Royal, supra note 24, at 240.  In addressing whether the images are a form of
speech, this Article assumes that the textual statements accompanying the graphic images are
in fact true.  As the government has leeway to require warning labels, the text warnings alone
should be considered information and therefore pass muster under the First Amendment.
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and speech as a value judgment would include articulating artificial argu-
ments and fabricating fictitious frameworks.  Thus, the opinion and value
judgment the images could be communicating will be addressed
collectively.
It is also important to point out that graphic images can perform an
informing function and an association function simultaneously.  For ex-
ample, the graphic images could help inform consumers of the addictive-
ness of nicotine while at the same time sending the message that smoking
is disgusting.  However, although graphic images can function to inform
and to associate simultaneously, a determination must be made as to
whether graphic images are more like forced association than informa-
tion.212  The Central Hudson analysis in the previous section proceeded
under the assumption that graphic images can function to inform,
whether or not the images should be considered a form of information
over a form of association under the First Amendment.  That analysis
was done in a vacuum apart from the association function.  That section
analyzed the informing function of the graphic images on an absolute
scale.
The inquiry here must simply be done on a relative scale, which
requires a yes or no answer to the question: “should the graphic images
be considered forced association?”  To illustrate the difference between
these sections, consider a simple situation.  Imagine that the Court can
rate the informing function and the association function of the graphic
images each from zero to ten.  Assume the Court rates the association
function of the images at six and rates the information function of the
images at five.  Because six is greater than five, the Court would hold the
images to be ideological in nature and therefore apply Wooley.  This in-
stance tells us that Wooley’s strict scrutiny does in fact apply, but tells us
nothing about whether the raking of five for the informing function
would survive Wooley’s strict scrutiny (or intermediate scrutiny if the
Court found the images to be informational in nature) standard review.
The specific question we are after here is whether the images indi-
rectly say that smoking is disgusting and that no one should ever
smoke.213  At one extreme, it is clear that a warning label stating “Smok-
ing is disgusting” or “No one should ever smoke” with accompanying
images representing these notions would obviously not be considered a
212 See Royal, supra note 24, at 236 (suggesting that in order to determine which First
Amendment test to apply to commercial speech, we must first decide what type of speech it
is).
213 This fact/value distinction has been debated by philosophers. See generally J.P.
Smith, The Supposed “Inseparability” of Fact and Value, 22 S. AFR. J. PHIL. 51, 51–60
(2003).
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form of information.  At some point, however, an image can portray the
same message.
At what point an image expresses a certain ideological message is
unclear.  The First Amendment, however, requires drawing the line be-
tween where graphic images accompanying textual statements become
less like information and more like saying that smoking is disgusting.  To
make this determination, I suggest using the behavioral economics re-
search that models the inner-workings of our minds when we are
presented with these images.  Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman’s model
of cognitive function distinguishes two modes of thinking and deciding,
corresponding to the so-called intuitive System I (i.e., “thoughts [that]
come spontaneously to mind, without conscious search or computation,
and without effort”) and the so-called reasoning of System II (i.e.,
thoughts done “deliberately and effortfully”).214  As Kahneman explains:
Reasoning is what we do when we compute the product
of 17 by 258, fill an income tax form, or consult a map.
Intuition is at work when we read the sentence ‘Bill
Clinton is a shy man’ as mildly amusing, or when we
find ourselves reluctant to eat a piece of what we know
to be chocolate that has been formed in the shape of a
cockroach.215
In the context of the graphic images on cigarette labels, the difference
between System I and System II in work amounts to the difference be-
tween consumers quickly, automatically, and effortlessly glancing at the
images in disgust and consumers taking the time and effort needed to
deliberately think: “Wow, this can really happen to me if I continue to
smoke!”216
This Article suggests using the two modes of thinking as a way to
determine whether the graphic images are considered information or
speech.217  Graphic images should be considered information if they ini-
214 See Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Eco-
nomics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1450 (2003); see also Keith Stanovich & Richard West,
Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCI. 658 (2000) (proposing the neutral labels of System I and System II).
215 See Daniel Kahneman, supra note 214, at 1450 (citing Paul Rozin & Carol Nemeroff,
Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The Contagion and Similarity “Heuristics,” in HEURISTICS
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE THOUGHT 201–16 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds.,
2002)).
216 See Kahneman, supra note 214, at 1453.
217 See, e.g., id. at 1451–52 (“The perceptual system and the intuitive operations of Sys-
tem I generate impressions of the attributes of objects of perception and thought.  These im-
pressions are not voluntary and need not be verbally explicit.  In contrast, judgments are
always explicit and intentional, whether or not they are overtly expressed.  Thus, System II is
involved in all judgments, whether they originate in impressions or in deliberate reasoning.
The label ‘intuitive’ is applied to judgments that directly reflect impressions.”).
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tiate System II, i.e., result in consumers reasoning through the informa-
tion presented.218  Otherwise, graphic images should be considered
speech if System I is in play, i.e., they result in an intuitive response
where they do not reason through the information.  Using the System I
versus System II structure in this determination is supported by the defi-
nition of information.  One definition of information applicable here is
“facts learned about something or someone,” where “learn” is defined as
“commit to memory.”219  The requirement to “commit to memory” in the
definition of learning is exactly the “slower, serial, effortful, and deliber-
ately controlled” operations of System II.220  Without this deliberation,
our minds will make intuitive judgments about the images unrelated to
the information the images attempt to help communicate.221
Most thoughts and actions are governed by the intuitive System I.222
It takes an external stimulus, such as a logical connection between an
image and the textual statement to activate System II.  Without such a
connection to stimulate System II, the intuitive System I will be at work
to associate the images with ideas not related to the information
presented in the textual statements.  It is the author’s opinion that only
two of the images in Figure 4 activate System II.  First, there is an obvi-
ous connection between the addictive nature of nicotine and the man
with smoke flowing out of his trachea.  That image should activate a
consumer’s System II for a number of reasons.  Many people may have
to look closely at the image to see what is actually happening, as many
people have not likely ever seen a smoker exhaling tobacco smoke out of
a hole in his trachea.  Moreover, many consumers may not realize the
218 See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand et. al., What is Advertising Worth?, 125 Q.J. ECON. 263,
268 (2010) (“The System II content does not have jointly significant effects on [action].  The
System I content does have jointly significant effects on [action].  Hence, in our context at
least, advertising content appears to be more effective when it aims to trigger an intuitive
rather than a deliberative response.  However, because the classification of some of our treat-
ments into System I or System II is open to debate, we view this evidence as more suggestive
than definitive.”).
219 These definitions are part of Google, Inc. dictionary, available at www.google.com.
220 See Kahneman, supra note 214, at 1451.
221 See id., at 1450.
222 See, e.g., TIMOTHY WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE
UNCONSCIOUS (2002); Daniel T. Gilbert, Thinking Lightly About Others: Automatic Compo-
nents of the Social Inference Process, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 189–211 (James S. Uleman &
John A. Bargh eds., 1989); Seymour Epstein, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory of Personal-
ity, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY, VOLUME 5PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
159–84 (Theodore Millon & Melvin J. Lerner eds., 1st ed. 2003).  We do, however, self-
monitor the quality of our intuition. See generally Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick,
Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
Nonetheless, such self-monitoring is not likely here because many intuitive judgments are
made, including some that are erroneous, because we are “content to trust a plausible judgment
that quickly comes to mind.”  Kahneman, supra note 214, at 1450.
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lengths people with extreme addiction will go to smoke.  For these two
reasons, many people’s System II will reason through the image as if it
were textual information, and therefore it should be considered a form of
information.
The second image that likely activates System II is the comparison
of a healthy lung and a diseased lung.  While the connection between
fatal lung disease and the picture of the discolored, diseased lung is not
totally clear (it is possible for a non-smoker to have lung disease), it is
understandable enough to serve as a stimulus and provoke a consumer to
connect the differences between the lungs in the image to the text.  That
image will likely activate most consumer’s System II because some con-
sumers may not realize what stained and diseased lungs look like in com-
parison to healthy lungs.  The image requires a consumer’s deliberation
to compare and reason through the differences between the healthy lung
and the diseased lung presented.  It is this effort that activates System II.
FIGURE 4: IMAGES THAT ACTIVATE SYSTEM II
In both of the images in Figure 4, the connection between the image
and the text seems to be great enough to activate the reasoning of System
II.  Therefore, this Article argues that these images should be considered
a form of information.  Other arguments can be made why these images
should be considered information.  One philosophical argument as to
why the images should be considered a form of information is that the
pictures are simply the same thing as a thousand words.  The image of
the man with smoke flowing out of his trachea informs consumers about
addictiveness in a way similar to reading an essay about how nicotine
can be addictive.  Therefore, because an essay cannot be printed on ciga-
rette labels (and consumers would not read it anyway),223 the images are
a substitute for the essay.  Moreover, even though most people would
think that the images are disgusting,224 this is not to say that the images
say that smoking is disgusting.  Arguably, the images simply point out
223 See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,642.
224 However, the actual underlying message that the graphic images will convey will vary
by consumer.  As the dissent in Discount Tobacco & Lottery points out, “the underlying mes-
sage that they convey will vary with the interpretation and context of its viewer.  The color
graphics can be seen one way by some smokers, yet another by other smokers—one way by
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the disgusting consequences of smoking.  This is one of many arguments
in favor of considering these images to be ideologically neutral informa-
tion.  However, this argument, as well as many others, is not as tractable
as the System I versus System II test.  One reason for this is that this
same argument can be applied to all the images, which is not the case
with the System I versus System II test.  For example, it is possible that
one day we will be able to reliably use brain scans to determine whether
a particular image activates the part of the brain in which System II oper-
ates.225  Further, we can survey consumers and study what thoughts the
images create.226  While we cannot precisely determine whether these
two images activate System II from a simple examination of its defini-
tion, it does provide us with an objective starting point.  This objective
starting point leads to the conclusion that the remaining seven images are
beyond ideology-neutral information.
It is this author’s opinion that the image-text connection with the
seven other images is far too faint to activate System II.  The images
attempt to evoke emotion generally, which will not activate System II’s
reasoning.  The reason for this is simple: the images present nothing for
consumers to reason over.  People know what dead is—they do not need
a stitched-up corpse to tell them.  There is no direct connection between
the stitched-up corpse and smoking—why would someone who died
from smoking be cut open like that?  The images present nothing to over-
come the fast, automatic, effortless operations of System I.  Television
and the news provide us with so many disturbing images on a daily basis
that we habitually ignore them.227  The graphic images present on ciga-
rette packs do nothing to overcome the intuitive System I governed by
habit.  Considering that most thoughts and actions are governed by the
intuitive System I, an example of a typical, intuitive reason for the lack
of connection needed to active System II is presented in the remaining
seven images.
Like persuasive advertisements, the images were “intended to create
a visceral reaction in the consumer, in order to make a consumer less
emotionally likely to use or purchase a tobacco product.”228  In doing so,
the images attempt to manipulate consumers’ emotions to prevent ra-
tional decision-making.  This is exactly what System I deals with.  Only
some non-smokers and yet an entirely different interpretation by other non-smokers.”  674
F.3d 509, 550 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., dissenting).
225 See, e.g., Kahneman, supra note 214, at 1450.
226 See, e.g., Bertrand et al., supra note 218, at 263.
227 See, e.g., Sigrun Landro Thomassen, Disturbing Images on the News, KIDSANDMEDIA
.CO.UK (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.kidsandmedia.co.uk/disturbing-images-on-the-news/.
228 Discount Tobacco & Lottery, 674 F.3d at 528, (drawing conclusions from Ellen Peters
et al., The impact and acceptability of Canadian-style cigarette warning labels among U.S.
smokers and nonsmokers, 9 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RESEARCH 4, 474 (2007)).
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two of the images have a connection that goes beyond the intuitive re-
sponse of System I to activate System II.  Thus, regardless of whether
emotion leads to consumers processing, comprehending, and remember-
ing the information better,229 the images were not designed simply for
their salience effect.  Rather, by including the images, the government
aims to get consumers to take its view that smoking is unjustifiable.  First
Amendment Doctrine allows courts to draw a “commonsense” distinc-
tion between prescribing speech that is ideological in nature and pre-
scribing “what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising.”230  If the
images were included only for their salience effect, images would have
been selected that establish a clear connection to the text and require
activation of System II’s reasoning.  However, these images were se-
lected for an entirely different purpose.  Therefore, all but two should be
considered a form of speech.  Thus, taking the nine images as a package,
the images should be unconstitutional under Wooley.
Behavioral economics has reshaped the way tobacco companies
promote cigarettes, how tobacco companies target consumers, and how
some governments require companies to disclose product risks.231  Gov-
ernmental use of more salient information is on the rise around the
world.  Graphic images are now placed on cigarette labels in over thirty
countries.232  Australia has recently taken Daniel Kahneman’s findings
one step further in a measure to nullify tobacco companies’ rights to use
brand-promoting advertisements on cigarette labels.233  New York City
recently expanded its consumer protection laws by requiring calorie la-
beling on food packaging and menus.234  It seems that Congress, like the
thirty countries adopting graphic image requirements on cigarette pack-
aging, does not trust the marketplace to work out the truths about tobacco
on its own.  How other countries deal with commercial advertising, how-
ever, is not necessarily how America should deal with tobacco advertis-
ing.  Whether we notice or not, behavioral economics has reshaped
commercial advertising.  What we may one day find out is whether be-
229 See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,642.
230 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Superior Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985) (ideological speech is speech that “prescribe[s] what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein”).
231 See, e.g., Ariely, supra note 23, at 48.
232 See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 36,633.
233 On December 1, 2012, Australia became the first country to ban tobacco logos from
cigarette packs altogether.  Thus, uniform font will now be the only identifying material on
cigarette packs. See Australia Is First Country to Require Plain, Logo-Free Cigarette Packag-
ing; Ruling Could Give Boost to Other Countries Interested in Doing Same, ADAGE.COM (Aug.
15, 2012), http://adage.com/article/global-news/australia-rules-plain-logo-free-cigarette-pack
aging/236696.
234 See New York City Health Code § 81.50. (2006).
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havioral economics will reshape the compelled commercial speech
doctrine.
CONCLUSION
This Article has illustrated how displaying information in more sali-
ent forms can transform otherwise ideologically-neutral information into
compelled ideology, and provides an analytical framework for assessing
the legal ramifications of this process.  To determine whether this trans-
formation has occurred, this Article suggests using behavioral economics
research that models the inner-workings of our minds when we are
presented with these images.  Specifically, this Article suggests that
graphic images are informational in nature if they result in consumer’s
reasoning through the information presented; otherwise, they should be
considered a form of speech.  By solving a game-theoretical model of the
compelled commercial speech doctrine, this Article argues that the
graphic image requirements should have been held unconstitutional
under Wooley because all but two images should be considered a form of
speech.  The reason is simple: the images add no additional information
for consumers to reason over.  For example, there is no direct connection
between a stitched up corpse and smoking.  People know what dead is
and they do not need an image of a corpse in order to understand.  The
images act as persuasive advertisements and are not included simply for
their salient effect.  Rather, the images manipulate consumers’ emotions
to prevent rational decision-making.  By requiring placement of the
graphic images on tobacco labels, the government forces tobacco compa-
nies to adopt the government’s ideology and compels society to take the
government’s view that smoking is unjustifiable.
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